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In the past, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks were made
secure through undocumented, proprietary protocols and isolation from other networks.
Today, modern information technology (IT) solutions have provided a means to enhance
remote access through use of the Internet. Unfortunately, opening SCADA networks to
the Internet has provided routes of attack. Cyber attacks on these networks are becoming
more common and can inﬂict considerable damage to critical infrastructure systems.
Furthermore, devices on these networks can be infected with malware that causes them to
falsify their responses to operators, concealing alternate operation or hiding alarm
conditions. Considering their applications, securing these networks translates to improved
physical security in the real world.
Since modern IT solutions are impractical to deploy in the resource constrained
SCADA networks, other solutions must be researched. This research evaluates an
integrity veriﬁcation system implemented on a Xilinx ML507 development board called
the SCADA IntEgrity VEriﬁcation (SIEVE) system. The design incorporates Bloom
ﬁlters and SCADA-speciﬁc intrusion detection techniques to speed identiﬁcation of
invalid commands and current sensing to investigate whether or not a device correctly
carried out a given command.
Results show that the SIEVE system is able to inspect and correctly identify 100% of
network traﬃc at a 200 command per second frequency. Correct identiﬁcation of valid
MODBUS/TCP traﬃc begins to fail at 350 commands per second, introducing false
positives. Tests of the Bloom ﬁlters show that they reduce the time necessary to process
and log invalid MODBUS/TCP commands by 4.5% to 2328.06% depending on the
number of operations performed by the command.
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INTEGRITY VERIFICATION FOR SCADA DEVICES
USING BLOOM FILTERS AND DEEP PACKET INSPECTION
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Behind the scenes, computer networks run many of society’s critical infrastructuresystems. In the past, these networks were secured through isolation and proprietary
protocols. Now, modern information technology (IT) networking solutions and use of the
Internet are being employed in order to increase eﬃciency through better remote access
and ease of implementation. Unfortunately, this new paradigm reduces the eﬃcacy of the
prior security boons. Even worse, network defense solutions for modern IT networks do
not translate eﬀectively to these Industrial Control Systems (ICSs).
ICS networks are comprised of distributed devices that correspond with a central
control point. Both the central control point and distributed devices are vulnerable to
attack when exposed to the open internet. Defending these networks has become ever
more important as cyber attacks result in physical eﬀects in the real world
[MW13, SFS11].
Aside from attacks originating outside of ICS networks, operators must now consider
attacks from inside the network. Discovered in June 2010, the STUXNET malware not
only infected computers in the these networks, but also the distributed devices [FMC11].
It overwrote portions of the devices’ code and caused them to falsify their reports to the
network operators. This would cause the operators to believe that the network is in a safe
state when in fact it could actually be unstable or dangerous.
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Since these networks are used in critical applications, where invalid operation causes
real world eﬀects, hardening their cyber security translates into improved physical
security.
1.2 Overview and Goals
At present, most research focuses on detection of invalid network traﬃc going to the
distributed devices. Little has been done to detect devices compromised by malware that
causes them to falsify their responses [FMC11]. This research implements a system to
provide realtime remote device security through integrity veriﬁcation. This is
accomplished through use of intrusion detection techniques and direct signal
measurement. The proposed system is implemented using an embedded system approach,
combining both hardware and software. Since the program structure of a supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) device is relatively static (not changing often), a
hardware implementation approach for this system makes sense.
Two experimental goals are established for this research. The ﬁrst is to determine if
the proposed system can in fact correctly process all packet types in realtime, which is
deﬁned as within ﬁve milliseconds. The second goal is to determine if the use of a
probabilistic data structure that is eﬃcient in both space occupied and lookup speed
provides any beneﬁt for processing packets. The hypotheses for these goals is that the
proposed system will be able to correctly process all packet types in under 5 ms and that
properly conﬁgured Bloom ﬁlters will improve processing time for invalid commands.
Five metrics are gathered in order to assess these goals: command processing time,




This chapter presents the motivation for the research and outlines the research goals.
Chapter 2 covers the background of the topic, presenting overviews in SCADA Network
security, Intrusion Detection technologies, and Bloom ﬁlters. Chapter 3 explains the
operation of theproposed system, its design criteria, and its detailed design. Chapter 4
presents the test methodology for the evaluation of the proposed system. Discussion and
analysis of the results of the experiments are presented in Chapter 5. Overall conclusions
and future work are discussed in Chapter 6.
3
II. Background
This chapter provides an overview of SCADA networks, intrusion detection,Bloom ﬁlters, and research related to these three topics. Topics relating to SCADA
networks such as their composition, vulnerabilities, and attacks against them are covered
in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 covers the basics of intrusion detection techniques as well as
the advantages of hardware based implementations of these services. Section 2.3
introduces the concepts central to the operation of Bloom ﬁlters and their applications.
Lastly, Section 2.4 presents research related to the covered topics.
2.1 SCADA Networks
2.1.1 Overview.
SCADA networks provide a human operator with the ability to control and monitor
geographically distributed sensors and actuators. The beneﬁts of this sort of control are
realized when the remote sensors or actuators are not only widely distributed but diﬃcult
to reach as well [Boy10]. These networks are operated around the world by both private
industry and national governments and are used to control manufacturing processes and
critical infrastructure [SFS11]. Examples of the critical infrastructure industries that
employ SCADA networks are water and wastewater, oil and gas, electricity, and
transportation.
A SCADA network is comprised of many diﬀerent electronic or mechanical devices.
The two primary components of such a network are the Master Terminal Unit (MTU) and
the geographically-dispersed intelligent control devices. The remote controllers are
subsequently connected to multiple sensors or other controllers at their respective ﬁeld
sites. Today, three types of intelligent control devices predominate: Remote Terminal
Units (RTUs), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), and Intelligent Electronic
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Devices (IEDs). The controllers diﬀer in their control circuit complexity and amount of
devices that they can control [SFS11, Boy10]. One of the ways in which these controllers
interact with other devices is through current loops. The most predominant
implementation of this control method is the 4 to 20 milliamp loop [Sol]. Communication
is achieved by one party driving the current in the loop to diﬀerent values while the other
party reads the changing value and responds accordingly. For the 4-20 mA loop, 4 mA
represents the smallest value while 20 mA represents the largest.
The MTU serves as the master SCADA server, distributing commands to the remote
devices and receiving data gathered from their sensors or controls. As shown in Figure 2.1,
it resides in a centralized location along with the Human-Machine Interface (HMI), Data
Historian, and I/O Server. The HMI is the means by which an operator can send
commands to the SCADA network as well as view data collected by the remote devices.
The Data Historian simply stores and timestamps data collected from the sensors and is
usually a standalone computer [SFS11]. Lastly the I/O Server serves as the interface
between the MTU and the remote devices and is generally a router or network switch.
Figure 2.1: Example SCADA Network [SFS11]
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Besides the network composition, SCADA networks diﬀer from traditional IT
networks in several key ways. First and foremost, SCADA networks are hard realtime
systems [SFS11]; that is, systems in which an operation completed after its deadline is
useless [ZJS11]. This implies that SCADA networks are highly intolerant to latency or
disruption. In a traditional IT network, delays in the millisecond range are tolerable and
do not aﬀect normal operations whereas in a SCADA network, a 5 ms delay could mean
the diﬀerence between a valve opening in time to release pressure from a water pipe or a
burst water main. Reliability requirements for a SCADA network are also much higher
than in traditional IT. So much higher in fact that even rebooting a computer would be
intolerable. Lastly, much of the software, communication, and overall operation of
SCADA networks are proprietary, causing traditional diagnosis and remedy of issues to be
either ineﬀective or very diﬃcult [AONR12, SFS11]. Consequently, due to how SCADA
networks are employed, any disruption in functionality could lead not only to human
quality of life issues but also safety risks as well.
2.1.2 Protocols.
SCADA Networks use a wide variety of proprietary protocols in order to
communicate. Examples include Ethernet/IP, DeviceNet, ControlNet, PROFIBUS,
MODBUS/TCP, DNP3, and Foundation Fieldbus [ILW06]. Of these SCADA protocols,
MODBUS/TCP and DNP3 are very widely implemented and documented
[Dut07, EBPS09].
This work will focuses on analysis and detection of attacks implemented using the
MODBUS/TCP protocol.
2.1.2.1 MODBUS.
MODBUS is a serial communications protocol introduced in 1979 by Modicon
[Dut07]. Originally implemented to allow serial communication between intelligent
control devices, it has now been established as one of the standard protocols for industrial
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control networks. The original MODBUS speciﬁcation implements the lowest two layers
of the OSI model [Mod12] – the physical layer and the link layer. Application layer
communications are enabled through the use of the MODBUS Application Protocol
[Dut07]. Communication using this protocol follows a master–slave relationship, that is
only the master can initiate communication, the slave merely responds. In SCADA
networks, the MTU is the master and the remote devices are slaves, allowing the use of a
shared communication medium, depicted as the Wide Area Networks in Figure 2.1.
The master–slave relationship of communication using the MODBUS Application
Protocol allows for an ordered exchange of data frames between the client and server
[Mod12]. As shown in Figure 2.2, a MODBUS Application Protocol frame, also called an
Application Data Unit (ADU), consists of a Protocol Data Unit (PDU), device speciﬁc
addressing information, and error checking ﬁelds [Mod12]. The ADU provides device
speciﬁc addressing and error correction while the PDU contains the function code and
related data. Overall, the ADU can represent either a command to a speciﬁc MODBUS
server or a response to a client from the same.
Figure 2.2: General MODBUS Frame [Mod12]
On a serial line such as RS232, the additional ﬁelds of the ADU add to the total
length of the frame. Due to limitations of the medium, the maximum size of an ADU is
256 bytes. If the additional address ﬁeld is one byte long and the error check ﬁeld is two
bytes, then the maximum size the PDU can have is 253 bytes [Mod12].
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The PDU represents either a command from a client that a server should carry out or
a response from a server to a client. It is encoded as a single byte function code and
various related data. The MODBUS protocol deﬁnes three diﬀerent types of PDU:
• MODBUS Request PDU
• MODBUS Response PDU
• MODBUS Exception Response PDU
The ﬁrst type of PDU, the MODBUS Request PDU, is the only PDU created by
clients. The other two PDUs, the MODBUS Response PDU and MODBUS Exception
Response PDU, are created by MODBUS servers and are responses to a Request PDU.
For each PDU type, the function code and related data have diﬀerent meanings. The
function code in the Request PDU represents a command for the device to execute, in a
Response PDU it was the command that was executed, and in an Exception Response
PDU it is the command the device attempted to execute but failed to do so correctly
[Mod12]. In a properly functioning SCADA network, the MODBUS Exception Response
PDU should never be present because invalid commands should never be issued to a
device.
As a one byte ﬁeld, 256 diﬀerent function codes are available. However, the
MODBUS Application Protocol reserves the upper 128 codes as exception responses.
This is because if an Exception Response PDU is generated, its function code ﬁeld is set
to the original function code plus 0x80 [Mod12]. An example is if a function code 0x01
resulted in an exception, the Exception Response PDU’s function code would be set to
0x81. In a normal response, the Response PDU’s function code is set to the same as
received in the Request PDU. An example is the function code of a Response PDU for a
Request PDU with function code 0x01 is 0x01 [Mod12]. Additionally, the MODBUS
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Application Protocol predeﬁnes 20 diﬀerent function codes [Mod12]. All other function
codes are available for user deﬁned commands.
The MODBUS Application Protocol also deﬁnes four types of data constructs which
can be operated on with function codes. Two of them, the coil and the discrete input, are
single bit constructs and the second two, the holding register and input register, are 16 bit
registers. Discrete inputs and input registers can only be read from, while coils and
holding registers can be written to as well as read. Conceptually, the read-only constructs
come from an external I/O system, an attached device perhaps, while coils and holding
registers are sourced by commands from a client, providing control information for the
controller itself. About half of MODBUS’ predeﬁned function codes utilize these
constructs [Mod12]. The predeﬁned function codes refer to these data constructs using a
two byte address ﬁeld where the addresses of the four constructs do not overlap. Thus, a
coil referred to at address 0x0000 is diﬀerent from the analog input at address 0x0000.
Consequently, a device is theoretically able to control 216 of each data construct.
2.1.2.2 MODBUS/TCP.
MODBUS/TCP is an embedding of the MODBUS serial-line protocol into TCP/IP.
This allows operators to control devices over a modern packet switched network rather
than direct links only. Figure 2.3 depicts both the MODBUS Application Protocol stack
and the MODBUS/TCP stack. As can be seen, for standard MODBUS, frames produced
in the application layer are transmitted directly over RS232 or RS485. For
MODBUS/TCP, some translation is done then the frames are wrapped in standard TCP/IP
packets and transmitted over Ethernet [Mod06].
Figure 2.4 depicts the basic MODBUS/TCP ADU. Instead of device-speciﬁc
addressing information as in the MODBUS serial line frame, a new ﬁeld is added called
the MODBUS Application Protocol (MBAP) Header. The MBAP header is seven bytes
long and contains a transaction identiﬁer, protocol identiﬁer, number of following bytes,
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Figure 2.3: MODBUS Communication Stack [Mod12]
and a unit identiﬁer. Table 2.1 contains a listing of the ﬁelds in the MBAP header, their
byte locations, and a description of their contents. The PDU ﬁeld of the MODBUS/TCP
ADU is the same as the MODBUS serial-line protocol. Due to this, the MODBUS/TCP
PDU also has a maximum length of 253 bytes. Therefore, including the MBAP Header,
TCP header, IP header, and Ethernet frame header, the maximum size of a MODBUS
TCP/IP packet is 314 bytes, that is 253 bytes (PDU) plus 7 bytes (MBAP header) plus 20
bytes (TCP header) plus 20 bytes (IP header) plus 14 bytes (Ethernet frame header).
Figure 2.4: MODBUS/TCP ADU [Mod06]
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Table 2.1: MBAP Header
Field Byte Numbers Description
Transaction Identiﬁer 0-1 Numerical identiﬁer for the current transaction
Protocol 2-3 Protocol Descriptor, set to 0x00 for MODBUS/TCP
Length 4-5 Total number of following bytes
Unit Identiﬁer 6 Unique device identiﬁer, set to 0xFF if not used
According to the MODBUS/TCP speciﬁcation, all MODBUS/TCP packets are sent
to TCP port 502 [Mod06]. In this way, MODBUS/TCP traﬃc can be identiﬁed by its
destination port.
2.1.2.3 DNP3.
DNP3 was developed by Westronic Incorporated between 1992 and 1994 [dnp12].
Westronic Incorporated intended DNP3 to be the ﬁrst “truly open” protocol standard for
use in the utility industry and tried to include as many of the best features of other
industrial protocols along with newly created features. Two speciﬁc requirements were
addressed in the design of the protocol: the need for scalability and emphasis on
reliability. The ﬁrst requirement resulted in the use of as few layers of the OSI model as
possible with a consequent reduction of necessary bandwidth (due to fewer headers). The
second requirement resulted in a frame with two cyclic redundancy check bytes for every
16 data bytes, allowing for detailed error detection at the devices, or outstations [dnp12].
Device connections in DNP3, unlike MODBUS, are all referred to as points. Points
can fall into one of ﬁve categories with an even larger selection of types called variations.
The ﬁve categories are binary inputs, analog inputs, counter inputs, control outputs, and
analog outputs. For instance, the analog input category has six variations which are listed
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below in Table 2.2. Similar to the MODBUS addressing scheme, each category of point is
individually indexed using integers [dnp12].
Table 2.2: Analog Input Variations
Variation Number Description
1 32-bit integer value with ﬂag
2 16-bit integer value with ﬂag
3 32-bit integer value
4 16-bit integer value
5 32-bit ﬂoating-point value with ﬂag
6 64-bit ﬂoating-point value with ﬂag
As stated above, DNP3 does not implement all layers of the OSI model in order to
reduce bandwidth consumption. It consists of a layer 2 protocol that provides segment
encapsulation into data link frames, data link frame decoding into transport segments,
error detection, and source and destination addressing, a layer 4 like transport function
that allows for packet fragmentation, and a layer 7 that deﬁnes functions and data types
[dnp12]. Thus, DNP3 can handle larger or more complex commands than MODBUS.
Communication between master and outstation in DNP3 is diﬀerent from MODBUS
in that outstations can generate spontaneous responses to the master. The spontaneous
responses are usually generated in order to inform the master of some event that has
occurred and should take notice of [dnp12]. This does not quite break the master–slave
communication relationship as spontaneous responses are more like informing that master
that some communication needs to happen.




When SCADA was originally implemented, network security was not a great
concern. Isolation from external networks and undocumented proprietary protocols
provided adequate protection from attack [HS05, ZJS11]. Improvements over the past
twenty years in network technology and the global connections provided by the Internet
allow SCADA networks to be run much more eﬃciently through remote administration
from any Internet-connected computer and at lower cost, however this is at the risk of
being open to the world [ILW06]. However due to the proprietary nature, hard realtime
requirements, and availability requirements of SCADA networks, traditional IT network
defense is extremely diﬃcult, if not impossible, to employ [CWY08, ZJS11].
Stouﬀer classiﬁes SCADA vulnerabilities into three categories: policy and
procedure, platform, and network [SFS11]. Policy and procedure vulnerabilities result
from improperly designed or executed procedures. An example is having no security
procedures for the network. Platform vulnerabilities are more hardware or software
oriented. These vulnerabilities are inherent to the devices or software and can be very
diﬃcult to protect against. Examples of this type of vulnerability include software buﬀer
overﬂows allowing remote code execution, insecure remote access to the devices, or
physical damage. Zhu describes this category of vulnerabilities as “extremely
detrimental” [ZJS11]. Mitigation strategies include implementing proper security controls
such as software patching and physical access control. The last category of vulnerability is
network. Network vulnerabilities occur due to network ﬂaws, improper conﬁgurations, or
incorrect administration of the network itself or other connected networks. An example of
a network vulnerability is transmission of passwords in clear text. This class of
vulnerability is protected against through careful network design and good network
administration.
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Ten models the vulnerability of SCADA networks through analytical means
[TLM08]. His model is represented using an extensible markup language (XML) ﬁle with
simulations accomplished using custom Visual Basic.Net code and MATLAB. The
simulations take into account system vulnerability, scenario vulnerability, and access point
vulnerability. His results suggest that taking basic security precautions such as
implementing a stronger login policy will lower the vulnerability of a given access point.
The IEEE suggests security should be balanced with operations and cover access and use
control, data integrity and conﬁdentiality, restricting data ﬂow, responding timely to
events, and ensuring network availability [IEE08].
2.1.4 Attacks.
SCADA networks have been increasingly subject to cyber attack. A congressional
report from March 2013 on electric grid vulnerability reveals that the industry is under
constant cyber attack [MW13]. The attackers also may not necessarily be individuals but
nation states as well [NWD+12].
According to Zhu, there are three diﬀerent types of targets in a SCADA network:
hardware, software, and communication stack [ZJS11]. Attacks on hardware include
obtaining remote or physical access to the system and changing the set points and
changing the data that the operator of the network sees. This ﬁrst attack could result in
causing the hardware to fail or an alarm to not go oﬀ while the second could result in
concealing alarm conditions or generating false alarms. A software attack takes advantage
of vulnerabilities in the software being run either by the remote devices or by the central
command center. Communication stack attacks are manifested more as denial of service
type attacks such as attempting to delay data or rerouting commands or requests to
unintended recipients. In fact, Yang demonstrated that SCADA networks are vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks via ARP spooﬁng [YML+12].
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In the past ten years, several signiﬁcant attacks on SCADA networks have been
realized. The most severe may be the STUXNET malware discovered in 2010
[AONR12, ZJS11, NWD+12]. STUXNET spread across systems using four diﬀerent
Windows 0-day vulnerabilities and searched for speciﬁc Siemens PLC software installed
on the system. If found, it modiﬁed the PLC code in order to sabotage the system.
Speciﬁcally, it caused the PLCs to execute rogue commands while replaying valid,
recorded data to the operators. This caused the PLCs to damage the devices they were
controlling while the operators believed everything was normal. The only way to detect
the invalid operation of the PLCs was to directly observe the operation of the controlled
devices. The danger this sort of malware attack presents is that it is very diﬃcult to detect
and can cause severe damage to the systems or to human life.
Attacks on SCADA networks need not be targeted. In 2003, the SQLSlammer Worm
infected over 75,000 computers. One system that became infected was the Davis-Besse
nuclear power plant in Ohio. Slammer managed to crash the SCADA network’s display
and monitoring system for almost ﬁve hours despite the existence of a ﬁrewall [NWD+12].
This caused performance issues as the system was not operating as expected.
Consequently, had an unsafe situation developed at the plant, the problem may have been
hidden from operators, possibly causing it to spiral out of control.
2.2 Intrusion Detection
2.2.1 Overview.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is either a device or software that examines
traﬃc on a network in an attempt to identify anomalous events [VM08]. It is important to
note that intrusion detection does not cause the packets to drop; instead traﬃc that violates
the network rules are ﬂagged and an alarm is raised. In traditional IT, IDSs use deep
packet inspection to look for either anomalous traﬃc or known attack signatures.
According to Zhu, these techniques both rely on primary evidence such as semantic
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deﬁnitions, access policies, or abstraction of known illegal patterns [ZS10]. Consequently,
intrusion detection in a SCADA environment can be diﬃcult to employ due to
hard-to-deﬁne illegal patterns or abnormal behavior.
A further problem that exists in employing intrusion detection in a SCADA
environment is the lack of computing resources. SCADA devices are commonly designed
to operate within the bare minimum of hardware and may not have the additional
resources required to operate an intrusion detection program [SFS11].
2.2.2 Techniques.
2.2.2.1 Non-SCADA Speciﬁc.
The two primary techniques for intrusion detection used by both traditional IT and
SCADA networks are signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection.
Signature-based detection focuses on detecting malformed packets and known attack
payloads through packet inspection. Figure 2.5 shows an example of the type of packet a
signature-based Intrusion Detection System would detect [VM08]. The packet on the left
is a correctly created and well formed MODBUS/TCP command packet whereas the
packet on the right has had its data length and data ﬁelds tampered with. In this case, a
PLC would read the malformed packet possibly causing a buﬀer overﬂow that could be
exploited.
Anomaly-based detection is also extendable to SCADA networks. This detection
technique is looking for network traﬃc patterns that do not match the norm with the key
requirement being consistent and predictable traﬃc patterns, which SCADA networks
exhibit. In this case, an anomaly-based detector is trained on normal traﬃc data and then
deployed into an operational environment. Once deployed it searches for traﬃc that is not
similar to what it has been trained on [LMV12]. Many researchers are actively
investigating this technique in relation to SCADA networks [LMV12, VM08, PK12].
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Figure 2.5: Correct and Incorrect MODBUS Packet [VM08]
2.2.2.2 SCADA Speciﬁc.
One of the primary purposes of a SCADA network is to monitor the state of a large
scale process. Assuming legitimate operators would never intentionally put a system into
a critical state, that is a state that could harm people or damage equipment, predicting the
eﬀect a command could have on a system would be an accurate method of determining if
an intrusion took place [CCG+11]. This form of detection seeks to model the state of the
system and how it evolves as new MODBUS commands arrive, sending an alert as the
system moves into a critical state. Carcano implemented a prototype IDS that implements
this method and tested it in a system composed of three PLCs each connected to a sensor
and a controller [CCG+11]. The prototype demonstrated a 0.35% false positive rate and a
0.05% false negative rate. In a separate performance test where the prototype was
connected to 16 PLCs each connected to “at least” 100 diﬀerent analog or digital devices,
he found calculation time grew linearly with rules and number of components per rule. In
the extreme case of 2000 diﬀerent rules, the prototype performed each state update in
57.386 ms.
Another SCADA-speciﬁc technique is speciﬁcation-based detection. Cheung
proposed the creation of rules using models to generate expected traﬃc on a system
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[CDF+07]. This is a form of whitelisting, and ensures that all traﬃc in a network is
actually well deﬁned and valid. Morris used the MODBUS speciﬁcation guides
[Mod06, Mod12] to deﬁne a set of 50 diﬀerent signature-based rules [MJVD13] that can
be integrated easily with popular software-based intrusion detection systems like Snort.
2.2.3 Hardware Implementations versus Software Implementations.
The platform upon which an IDS is implemented is generally not as important as the
optimization and speed of the IDS software. However, as stated above, SCADA networks
are constrained in terms of processing speed, memory, and network speed; they simply do
not have the resources to run additional software. Additionally, SCADA networks have
hard realtime requirements; completing a request on time is of paramount importance
[SFS11]; thus the IDS must be able to inspect traﬃc in millisecond time frames.
Hardware-based IDSs developed on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)s oﬀer these
types of performance capabilities. The beneﬁts that an FPGA oﬀers is parallelism and the
ability to develop specialized hardware to support the algorithm.
Signature matching is an algorithm that is highly parallelizable. This is possible
because a packet need not be compared to only one other item at a time. Dharmapurikar
accomplishes this through the use of parallel Bloom ﬁlters [DKSL04]. He implemented a
prototype system for matching one string against 10,038 other strings and achieved a
throughput of 2.46 Gbps. The parallel Bloom ﬁlters only used 14% of the FPGA fabric of
a Xilinx XCV2000E as well. Sourdis took the concept further and implemented custom
pipelined comparators and encoders [SP05]. Each digital structure in his design translates
directly to a speciﬁc rule for the popular IDS software Snort. After implementing a total
of 210 structures (or rules), his system achieved a throughput of 8.064 Gbps and used 71%
of the FPGA area in a Xilinx Virtex2-6000. He speculates that through more optimization





Bloom ﬁlters are a space-eﬃcient probabilistic data structure proposed by Bloom in
1970 [Blo70]. Their intended use is to test whether a message is a member of a particular
set of messages. In this case, messages refer to data structures represented by a string of
bits. Their probabilistic nature manifests in that false positives are a possible outcome of
membership queries. This drawback is oﬀset by the space saving of the structure itself as
well as the time-eﬃcient query operation. Unlike false positives, false negatives are not
possible, thus if a negative is returned on a query the object is deﬁnitely not in the set.
In traditional hash tables a message is hashed using some algorithm to get an index in
the table. Next, the table entry at the index is checked to see if it is empty. If it is, the
original message is stored. If it is not empty, the hashed message is hashed again using the
same algorithm in order to get a new address. This process is repeated until an empty
address is found for the message [Blo70]. A query operation is similar in that the message
to be queried is hashed to get an index then the message at that index is compared to the
hashed message. If they match, the message is in the set. If it does not match, the index
must be hashed and the next location checked. This operation repeats until either the
message or an empty location is found. Both operations entail several executions of the
hashing algorithm and, depending on how full the hash table is, could take many clock
cycles to complete.
Instead of a table, a Bloom ﬁlter consists of a bit array m bits wide all initialized to
‘0’ and k diﬀerent hash functions that produce hashes ranging from 0 to m − 1. Both m
and k must be whole numbers and greater than or equal to 1. A newly created Bloom ﬁlter
with m=8 is depicted in Figure 2.6. An insertion is accomplished using the k diﬀerent
hash functions to get k diﬀerent addresses in the bit array and setting those entries to ‘1’,
regardless of their current value. Figure 2.7 depicts an example insertion of a message into
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an eight bit wide Bloom ﬁlter with k equal to two. A lookup is performed by ﬁrst hashing
a message using the same k hash functions as in the insertion operation. If each entry
corresponding to the resulting k addresses is ‘1’, the message may be in the set. Figure 2.8
shows a lookup of two messages, Message 1 and Message 2. Message 1 had previously
been inserted into the ﬁlter in Figure 2.8 while Message 2 has not been inserted at all.
This lookup example also demonstrates the impossibility of false negatives. A single ‘0’
bit from any address results in a negative lookup. Due to hash collisions, a positive lookup
result does not necessarily indicate that the message is in the set. An example of this can
be seen in Figure 2.9 – this is the false positive problem [Blo70].
Figure 2.6: Uninitialized Bloom Filter
The false positive rate p is
p =
(
1 − en ∗ km
)k
(2.1)
where m is the number of bits in the ﬁlter, n is the the number of messages in the set, and k
is the number of hash functions. Generally, assuming a ﬁxed m, the false positive rate
increases as messages are inserted into the ﬁlter and decreases as the number of hash







as a starting point for minimizing p. By substituting Equation 2.2 for p in Equation 2.1, k







When k is chosen in this fashion, the false positive rate becomes the original substition for
p, Equation 2.2 [DKSL04]. This also allows k to be determined as a function of the ratio
of bit array width m and number of messages n.
Unlike hash tables, deletions are not possible in standard Bloom ﬁlters. This is due to
presence in the Bloom ﬁlter being represented as a single bit. In the case where an address
relates to one item only, setting the stored bit to ‘0’ is not a problem. In the case where the
address is shared, setting the stored bit to ‘0’ aﬀects other items in the ﬁlter, introducing
false negatives. Diﬀerent Bloom ﬁlter implementations have been developed
[FCAB00, MLVD12] to circumvent this problem and are described below.
Another important consideration when implementing a Bloom ﬁlter is the hashing
algorithm. Often the hash algorithm calculations are time consuming, taking more than
one clock cycle to compute. Along with computation speed, a small probability of
collisions is desirable [PK12]. A class of hashing algorithms that ﬁts these requirements is
H3 [CW79]. Algorithms that belong to H3 create hashes by performing a logical AND on
a random bit vector for each bit in a message. The resultant vectors are subsequently
exclusive ORed together to obtain a single hash. As shown in Figure 2.10, each bit of a
message is logically ANDed with a corresponding random vector. The results of these
AND operations are subsequently exclusive ORed together to determine a ﬁnal hash. The
three-byte random vectors are chosen to show the ﬁnal result is diﬀerent from the inputs.
Ramakrishna determined this class of hashing algorithms is ideal for hardware-speciﬁc
implementation due to ease of translation into physical structure and inherent parallelism
[RFB97]. Figure 2.11 depicts such an implementation where the xi values are input bits
from a message and qi, j values are bits from the random vectors. For Bloom ﬁlters, the
random bit vectors can be log2(m) bit long numbers, where m is the number of bits in the
ﬁlter, such that the ﬁnal hash represents the address of a bit [DKSL04].
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Figure 2.7: Bloom Filter Insertion Example
Figure 2.8: Bloom Filter Lookup Example
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Figure 2.9: Bloom Filter False Positive Example
Figure 2.10: H3 Algorithm Example
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Figure 2.11: Circuit implementation of an H3 Algorithm [RFB97]
2.3.2 Types.
The counting Bloom ﬁlter attempts to overcome the problem of false negatives
introduced by deleting entries in standard Bloom ﬁlters [FCAB00, MKR12, GLLY10]. In
a counting Bloom ﬁlter, instead of the ﬁlter being a bit array, an array of counters is used.
When an item is inserted, the counter is incremented and when one is deleted it is
decremented. Querying a counting Bloom ﬁlter takes slightly more time as the results of a
greater than zero comparison on the entries to be examined are used as input to the AND
operation signifying presence in the ﬁlter instead of the contents of the entry alone. In
situations where deletions are necessary, such as a ﬁlter whose set has members that can
“age” out, this may be acceptable when slower access speed is not a factor [GLLY10].
Mukuntharaj characterized the performance impact in a hardware implementation that
could achieve lookup throughputs in the 5 Gbps range [MKR12].
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Other exotic Bloom ﬁlters have been created for various purposes. Moreira
developed a Bloom ﬁlter he terms the concatenated Bloom ﬁlter that is resistant to
saturation attacks [MLVD12]. A saturation attack is when enough items are inserted into
the Bloom ﬁlter such that every entry is equal to ‘1’, thereby making it useless as a
discriminator. The concatenated Bloom ﬁlter works by dividing the main ﬁlter into d
subﬁlters each with size m/d. Elements are inserted into the ﬁlter one by one, each one
going into a diﬀerent subﬁlter. When the d+1th element is reached, it is inserted in to the
ﬁrst subﬁlter and the operations continue. By intelligently picking d, he demonstrated that
the false positive rate can be bounded and never reach 1.
2.3.3 Applications.
Bloom ﬁlters have been used in a wide variety of applications. Recently they have
been used for IP traﬃc analysis [LRBS12], discovery protocols [SMPMLVLS11], and
intrusion detection [PK12, DKSL04, MKR12]. In each application they are slightly
diﬀerent. Lambruschini, Dharmapurikar, and Mukunthuraj use the ﬁlters as classiﬁers,
indicating whether a tested packet is in one set or another. Parthasarathy uses them as
sequence identiﬁers, indicating whether a sequence of commands is anomalous. In these
applications the key is speed. Sanchez-Monedero exploits their other widely known
beneﬁt of compact size in order to ease network congestion from transmitting network
endpoint information across a peer to peer network by using them as a compact storage
medium that can be easily transmitted [SMPMLVLS11].
2.4 Related Research
2.4.1 Role-Based Authentication.
Role-based authentication has been implemented as one way of securing SCADA
networks. Hieb created a security-hardened appliance in order to implement role-based
authentication using a Gumstix microcontroller and Bloom ﬁlters [HSG13]. This device
sits inline with the MTU and RTU, acting as a gate keeper. The microcontroller runs a
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form of Linux with a kernel that is diﬃcult to attack due to compartmentalization and
thorough debugging. With the device secure, a challenge-response authentication protocol
is implemented. If an incoming command would cause a change in settings, the device
responds with a challenge to the sender. The sender must be able to decipher the challenge
and send a response with a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC). If the
HMAC in the response matches the one the device calculated, the command is passed
through to the device. Non-critical commands such as read coils do not need to be
authenticated as they are not changing the system in any way. Bloom ﬁlters are used in
this design as a way to look up commands. It employs two Bloom ﬁlters, the ﬁrst to check
if the command is valid and the second to determine if the command is critical, that is a
command that would change the device’s state. On the Gumstix device, a Bloom ﬁlter
lookup took 18 μs. In testing, the device was able to stop unauthorized write attempts to
the device but not read attempts. This is due to read commands being non-critical. The
current implementation of the device takes 200 ms to generate the initial challenge, which
could delay a command past its execution deadline.
2.4.2 Bloom Filter Anomaly Detection.
Work is also being done using Bloom ﬁlters and anomaly detection to prevent
intrusions in smart grids [PK12]. Parthasarathy proposed an anomaly detection based IDS
that takes into account system state. In his implementation, normal traﬃc is ﬁrst analyzed
using n-gram analysis. N-gram analysis analyzes sequences using a sliding window of
size n. For his proposed system, he uses n=5 messages and splits the function codes and
data into separate n-grams, yielding two types of sequences. These sequences are then
inserted into two Bloom ﬁlters for fast lookup later. Upon receiving a new packet, it is
inserted into the current test n-gram and looked up in the Bloom ﬁlters. Anomaly scores
are assigned to both the function code n-gram and data n-gram which are subsequently
added together to yield a composite anomaly score. His implementation showed a 2.4%
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false negative rate for n=100 but 0% for n=200 and n=500. The system operates on the
order of “a few ms” for varying sizes of data, demonstrating a constant lookup speed. This
delay would likely be acceptable on a SCADA network.
2.4.3 Critical State Based Firewall.
Critical state-based detection is a new method of intrusion detection [CCG+11].
Fovino has taken the concept proposed by Carcano and implemented a critical state-based
ﬁrewall [FCCM12]. The Fovino ﬁrewall consists of a rule analyzer and state controller.
The state controller keeps track of the current state of the system by monitoring all traﬃc
from the MTU to the remote device. Any change in state indicated by the device is
reﬂected in the state controller’s virtual system image. The rule analyzer monitors the
virtual system image searching for any critical states or evolution towards critical state
using a calculation Fovino refers to as the state distance metric. In network performance
tests, it adds less than two ms of additional latency which Fovino characterizes as
negligible. The virtual system image can consume up to 400 MB of memory when 1000
PLCs are connected. The state distance metric suﬀers as more rules are added, taking over
50 ms to update. However, the 50 ms is not involved in blocking commands, only in
raising alerts. In this sense, while slow, it can still be considered acceptable. Fovino has
demonstrated that this type of detection is viable however requires a non-negligible
amount of computing resources.
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III. Device Overview
This chapter covers the design and operation of the SCADA IntEgrityVEriﬁcation (SIEVE) system. Section 3.1 covers the basic operation of the system.
Section 3.2 covers the criteria used to design the system. Lastly, Section 3.3 describes in
depth the operation of custom-designed components.
3.1 System Overview
Integrity veriﬁcation on SCADA networks is a diﬀerent approach to intrusion
detection. Intrusion detection on SCADA networks is a fast evolving ﬁeld with many
unique aspects [ZS10]. While many solutions have been proposed for detecting attacks in
progress [ZS10], little has been proposed in order to detect already compromised devices.
Furthermore, intrusion detection does not take into account the erstwhile operator who
unknowingly sends a command that puts the system in an unsafe state. The SIEVE system
is designed to fulﬁll these purposes: verifying the validity of incoming network traﬃc and
the integrity of the PLC’s response.
In order to verify the integrity the PLC, the SIEVE system must be eﬃcient in its
operations. This was achieved through integration of both software and hardware
structures in an embedded design, implemented using a Xilinx ML507 development board
and a custom designed current sensing circuit. The speciﬁc command processing method
is speciﬁcation-based, combining Cheung’s Model Based Intrusion Detection [CDF+07]
scheme with Morris’ MODBUS/TCP Rules Based Intrusion Detection [MJVD13], and
implemented with hardware elements similar to Sourdis’ FPGA-based signature matching
algorithm [SP05]. Rather than storing allowable commands in hardware arrays like
Sourdis’ FPGA, all valid commands are instead stored in a Bloom ﬁlter. Thus, when a
command arrives it is dissected and looked up in a Bloom ﬁlter. If the Bloom ﬁlter lookup
28
returns a negative result an alert is raised. If a positive result is returned, the packet is
inspected again in software to conﬁrm its validity due to possibility of false positives from
the Bloom ﬁlter. This is necessary because any invalid commands sent to a PLC or other
remote device could result in catastrophic failure.
Verifying the integrity of a response is more diﬃcult than verifying the validity of a
command. For responses, several steps are required. First, is to match the transaction ID
and function code to the preceding command. Assuming the match is made, the response
must be further processed to determine if any monitored lines were operated on. This can
be diﬃcult due to lack of information in the response packet itself. For instance, in read
operations, the MODBUS command contains a base address and the number of
subsequent reads to perform. An example is a read ﬁve coils command with base address
0x0000 means respond with the contents of coils at addresses 0x0000 - 0x0004. The
response the PLC provides contains the speciﬁed data but not the base address nor how
many coils were read, it is assumed that client that sent the command has that information.
Consequently, if a valid command is received it must be stored but not logged as invalid in
order to facilitate processing the response. Also, if the response proves to be invalid, the
lack of information could preclude analysis as to why it was marked invalid. Thus, if a
response is found to be invalid, the previous valid command is logged at the same time in
order to provide context. Speciﬁc command and response compositions will be discussed
below in Section 3.3.
Another aspect of verifying the validity of a response is ensuring that the PLC
actually executed the command. The SIEVE system accomplishes this by monitoring
speciﬁc I/O lines coming from or going to a PLC. The SIEVE system assumes these I/O
lines are 4-20 mA current loops. The monitoring is performed by reading the actual value
of a line and comparing it against what the PLC reports after a command is executed. The
reading is performed using Analog to Digital Converters (ADCs) and current sense
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circuits. The operational speciﬁcs of the current sense circuits and ADCs are covered in
Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 respectively.
Figure 3.1 depicts the concept diagram for the SIEVE system. It monitors commands
and responses to the PLC from the MTU and reads from the I/O lines going to or from
other devices. A communication line separate from the line used for commands and
responses is used a means of alerting the operators when suspicious activity is detected.
Figure 3.1: SIEVE System Concept
3.1.1 Algorithm.
The algorithm that the system operates on can be seen below in Figure 3.2. The basic
ﬂow is as follows:
1. Receive a packet going to or from the PLC.
2. Determine its direction in order to interpret it as a command or response.
3. Determine if it is MODBUS.
4. If it is not MODBUS, log the packet and report an error.
30
5. If it is a MODBUS command, process it through the Bloom ﬁlter.
(a) If it is not in the Bloom ﬁlter, log the packet and report an error.
(b) If it is in the Bloom ﬁlter, determine if a command is expected.
(c) If a command is not expected, log the packet and report an error.
(d) If a command is expected, process it through software.
(e) If it is invalid, log the packet and report an error.
(f) If it is valid, copy its information for processing the future response and expect
a response for the next packet.
(g) Wait for a new packet going to or from the PLC.
6. If the packet is a MODBUS response, determine if a response is expected
(a) If a response is not expected, log the packet and report an error.
(b) If a response is expected, determine if its header information matches the
previous command’s header information.
(c) If the header information does not match the previous command’s, log the
previous command, log the response, and report an error.
(d) If the header information does match the previous command’s, determine if
any lines that were operated on by the command are monitored.
(e) If there are none, expect a command for the next packet and wait for the next
packet to or from the PLC.
(f) If one or more monitored addresses were operated on, query the ADCs.
(g) If the ADC responses do not match the MODBUS response, log the previous
command, log the response, and report an error.
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(h) If the ADC responses match the MODBUS response, expect a command for
the next packet and wait for the next packet to or from the PLC.
Figure 3.2: Packet Workﬂow
Three workﬂows come out of this algorithm: one for non-MODBUS/TCP packets,
one for MODBUS/TCP commands, and one for MODBUS/TCP responses. The ﬁrst
workﬂow ends as soon as the packet is identiﬁed as not being MODBUS/TCP, meaning
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the oﬀending packet is logged and a warning is sent. If the packet is identiﬁed as
MODBUS/TCP it then ﬂows down one of the other two workﬂows depending on its
direction - that is, if its destination was the PLC then it is identiﬁed as a command and if
its destination is not the PLC, then it is treated as a response. The destination MAC
address is used for the direction decision because they are the ﬁrst six bytes of the
received ethernet frame.
For commands, the next step is further hardware processing in order to be sent
through a Bloom ﬁlter. If all the operations in the command are present in the Bloom
ﬁlter, then the command is passed back up to the software side of the system for further
processing. If any one operation is not in the Bloom ﬁlter, then the packet is logged and a
warning is sent. After being passed back to software, the command is processed in much
the same way it was in the Bloom ﬁlter. If any one operation is not valid, then the
command is considered invalid and the packet is logged with a warning sent to the
operator. If the command proves to be valid, it is stored for use when processing the
response.
If a MODBUS/TCP response is received, the ﬁrst check is to determine if a response
is expected. If it is not, the response is logged as a suspicious packet without logging the
previous command. If a response was expected, the system proceeds to inspect it further.
If its transaction ID or function code does not match those of the previous command, both
command and response are logged. This is because it is unknown if the next response
received will be valid for the current command – it in eﬀect resets the state of the system
to expect a command. If the response transaction ID and function code match the previous
command, then its contents are processed to ensure the PLC correctly executed the
command. This is done by loading the base address and iterating over all addresses
operated on in the command. If an address matches a monitored line, the line’s ADC is
queried to get a reading as to the value of the line. If the reading does not match what was
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speciﬁed for the line, the response and previous command are logged. Otherwise, the
response is valid and a command is expected next.
The command followed by a response structure of the algorithm derives from the
MODBUS/TCP protocol itself [Mod12]. According to the protocol speciﬁcation, new
commands cannot be sent until a response, whether valid or exceptional, is received.
3.2 Design Considerations
The design of such a service involves at minimum the consideration of three criteria:
speed, accuracy, and ﬂexibility, which are deﬁned more in depth below,
3.2.1 Speed.
Speed is one of the most critical factors in the design of the SIEVE system. Since
SCADA networks are hard realtime systems, the analysis of any command, response, or
packet going to or from the PLC before the execution deadline is critically important. The
SIEVE system achieves this through both hardware and software methods. In fact,
leveraging custom hardware greatly improves the speed of the system due to dedicated
pipelines and minimization of command execution overhead.
3.2.2 Accuracy.
Accuracy is the other critical factor in the design of the SIEVE system. Identiﬁcation
of malicious or invalid commands are of paramount importance to protecting the
operation of SCADA network. Consequently, every command, response, or
non-MODBUS/TCP packet going to or from the PLC must be inspected and its validity
veriﬁed. This means that under normal operating conditions, the SIEVE system must be
able to correctly identify invalid activity 100% of the time. This is accomplished through
the two stage hardware-software command veriﬁcation and in-depth response analysis.
3.2.3 Flexibility.
The MODBUS Application Protocol allocates four 16-bit address ranges for the four
basic data constructs: coils, discrete inputs, holding registers, and input registers. PLCs
34
using MODBUS/TCP for communication must then use some or all of those ranges in
order to correctly execute their programs. Given this, the SIEVE system must also be able
to fully replicate those ranges in order to handle any command or response to or from the
PLC it is monitoring. This is accomplished through use of oﬀ-chip memory as the Virtex
5 FPGA does not have enough onboard block RAM structures to store the necessary data.
3.3 System Design
3.3.1 MODBUS Inspection Core.
The MODBUS Inspection Core consists of nine hardware structures and is written in
VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL). Figure 3.3 depicts a simpliﬁed block
diagram of their relations to each other. Data ﬂows left to right except for the extracted
function code which acts as a selector to the depicted multiplexer and demultiplexer. If an
erroneous ﬁeld is found while inspecting the packet, the entire core enters an error state,
which alerts the CPU. This error state can only be reset by the CPU. Likewise, once a
packet is completely inspected the ﬁnished state is only cleared through a reset by the
CPU.
The Packet FIFO is the only non-custom designed hardware structure at the top level.
The following sections describe in depth the operation of the other eight structures.
3.3.1.1 Packet Decode.
Figure 3.4 shows the state diagram of the Packet Decode block. In the Ready state,
the Packet Decode block waits for a signal to begin decoding a packet stored in the Packet
FIFO. This signal is provided to the core by the software running on the PowerPC CPU.
After start goes high (logic ’1’) the block transitions to the Initialize state. The initialize
state sets up the internal signals to begin operation, like resetting counters to 0. After one
clock cycle, the block transitions to the Decode state. In this state, it reads the ﬁrst 62
bytes of the packet from the Packet FIFO two bytes at a time. This takes 31 clock cycles
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Figure 3.3: Simpliﬁed Block Diagram of the MODBUS Inspection Core
to complete. As the bytes are read, diﬀerent ﬁelds are inspected to determine whether or
not the packet is in fact MODBUS/TCP as well as if it is a command or a response.
Table 3.1 contains the inspected ﬁelds and their byte numbers. Direction of the packet is
determined by inspecting the ﬁrst six bytes of the packet and comparing them to the
PLC’s MAC address, corresponding to the Ethernet frame’s destination. If they are equal,
it is a frame going to the PLC and should be interpreted as a command. Otherwise it is a
frame coming from the PLC, and it is a response.
After determining direction, the next inspected ﬁeld is the TCP destination port. As
noted in Section 2.1.2.2, the TCP destination port should always be equal to integer 502.
Thus, if the bytes are not equal to integer 502, the packet decode block transitions to its
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error state and raises an error. If the TCP destination port is equal to integer 502,
inspection continues.
The next ﬁeld inspected is the protocol ID in the MBAP header. As noted in Section
2.1.2.2, this should be set to integer 0. If the inspected bytes are not equal to 0, the block
transitions to an error state and stops processing the packet. Otherwise, it continues
processing.
Figure 3.4: Packet Decode Block State Diagram
The last inspected ﬁeld is the MBAP following length ﬁeld. This ﬁeld should be set
to the packet length minus 60 as the last byte of this ﬁeld is the 60th byte in the packet. If
it is not, the block transitions to the error state. If this last ﬁeld passes inspection, the
function code is extracted to be used by the rest of the core. This occurs on clock cycle 31.
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On the 32nd clock cycle, the ﬁnished signal goes high to signal the subsequent structures
to continue inspecting the packet.
Table 3.1: MBAP Header
Byte Number Field Description Expected Value
0-5 Destination MAC Address PLC MAC Address
36-37 TCP Destination Port 502
56-57 MBAP Protocol Identiﬁer 0
58-59 MBAP Following Length Packet Length - 60
61 Function Code N/A
3.3.1.2 Function Code Check.
This is a simple hardware block that interprets the extracted function code. If the
extracted function code is not in the block’s lookup table, the block signals that the
function code is invalid. This places the core in an error state.
3.3.1.3 Read Interpreter.
The read interpreter block handles all function codes that perform read operations.
All read functions have the same command format: two bytes for the start address and two
bytes for the number of read operations to perform. Table 3.2 contains the supported
functions and their maximum number of operations.
Figure 3.5 shows the state diagram of the Read Interpreter Block. The Read
Interpreter functions in much the same way as the Packet Decode Block. Initially it begins
in the Ready state. After packet decode has been completed, the ﬁnished signal from the
packet decode block is routed to the start signal of the read interpreter through a
demultiplexer. When this signal goes high, the block transitions to the Initialize state.
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Table 3.2: Read Function Codes
Function Code Description Maximum Operations
0x01 Read Coils 2000
0x02 Read Discrete Inputs 2000
0x03 Read Holding Registers 125
0x04 Read Input Registers 125
Figure 3.5: Read Interpreter Block State Diagram
In the Initialize state the internal signals and counters of the block are set to their
initial value. The packet length is also checked to conﬁrm that it is the correct length of
packet for a read operation: 66 bytes. If it is not the correct length, the core transitions to
the Error state and processing of the packet halts. If the length is correct, the interpreter
transitions to the Read Address state. The next two bytes of the packet are the base
address of the operation and must be stored. After storing the base address, the interpreter
transitions to the Read Number of Operations state. The ﬁnal two bytes of the packet are
the number of consecutive reads to perform. This ﬁeld must be at least one but less than or
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equal to the maximum number of operations shown in Table 3.2. If the number of
operations is not in bounds, the core transitions to the Error state. Otherwise, the core
transitions to the Produce Mini Packets state.
A mini packet is an interpretation of one operation that a MODBUS/TCP command
performs. Created for the SIEVE system, they are used to translate commands into a
series of operations that can be individually hashed and looked up in the Bloom ﬁlters.
This allows for ﬂexibility in the composition of commands going to the PLC without
having to hash and store every single permutation of operations. Read mini packets are 24
bits (three bytes wide) and consist of the function code concatenated by the address to
operate on. The interpreter calculates these by incrementing the base address until the
number of operations has been reached. For example, a Read Coils command with base
address 0x0005 and number of operations equal to three results in three mini packets:
0x010005, 0x010006, and 0x010007. After all mini packets have been produced, the
interpreter transitions to an Operation Complete state.
If at any time during the operation of the interpreter the read Bloom ﬁlter indicates
that a mini packet is not in the ﬁlter, the core transitions to the Error state.
3.3.1.4 Single Write Interpreter.
The Single Write Interpreter handles both single write commands: Write Single Coil
and Write Single Holding Register. Their function codes are 0x05 and 0x06 respectively.
Despite the coil being a single bit and the holding register being a two byte register, both
commands have the same format. The ﬁrst two bytes are the base address and the
following two bytes are the data to be written. For coils, the only two acceptable values
are 0xFF00 or 0x0000, representing logic ‘1’ and ‘0’ respectively.
Figure 3.6 shows the state diagram of the Single Write Interpreter. The interpreter
begins operation in the Ready state. After the Packet Decode block has ﬁnished its
operations, the ﬁnished signal is routed to the start input of the Single Write Interpreter.
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When this signal goes high, the interpreter transitions to the Initialize state. In this state
internal signals are reset to their initial values. The length of the packet is also checked to
ensure it is the correct length of a single write packet: 66 bytes. If the length is not correct,
the core transitions to the Error state.
Figure 3.6: Write Single Interpreter State Diagram
If the length is correct, the core transitions to the Read Address state. The two bytes
read from the packet in this state are the address which is to be written. After they are
stored in a register, the core transitions to the Read Data state. The ﬁnal two bytes of the
packet are the data to be written to either the coil or register. These bytes are stored in a
register and the core transitions to the Produce Mini Packets state.
Much like the read interpreter, the single write interpreter also translates the
MODBUS/TCP packet into a more compact form for the Bloom ﬁlter. For writes, this is a
40 bit (ﬁve bytes wide) mini packet. It consists of the function code concatenated with the
address ﬁeld, which is in turn concatenated with the data ﬁeld. After this mini packet is
output to the write Bloom ﬁlter, the core transitions to an Operation Complete state.
If at any time during the operation of this core the Bloom ﬁlter establishes that a
command is not in the ﬁlter, the core transitions to the Error state.
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3.3.1.5 Write Multiple Coil Interpreter.
The Write Multiple Coil Interpreter is the ﬁrst of two interpreters that handle a single
function code. This is due to the command’s unique structure. The Write Multiple Coils
command is function code 0x0F and requires the most processing of all the implemented
commands. The command is structured as follows: two-byte base address, two-byte
number of operations, one-byte following byte count, and lastly byte count number of
bytes of data. Unlike in the Write Single Command, data for writing multiple coils is
packed bitwise into a byte rather than two bytes representing a single bit. Consequently,
for each operation the correct bit needs to be extracted in order to create the correct mini
packets. The maximum number of operations in the Write Multiple Coils command is
1968.
Figure 3.7 shows the state diagram of the Write Multiple Coil Interpreter. The Write
Multiple Coil Interpreter begins operation in the Ready state. When the Packet Decode
block ﬁnishes its operation, if the extracted function code was 0x0F, the ﬁnished signal is
routed to the start signal of the write multiple coil interpreter. When this signal goes high,
the interpreter transitions to the Initialize state.
In the Initialize state, the interpreter resets all internal signals and counters to their
initial values. After one clock cycle it transitions to the Read Address state. The next two
bytes read from the packet are the base address of the operation. After these are stored for
later use, the interpreter transitions to the Read Number of Operations state. After the base
address, the next two bytes of the packet are the number of operations to perform. If these
bytes are less than one or more than 1968, the core transitions to the Error state.
Otherwise, it transitions to the Read Byte Count state. The byte count is equal to the
number of operations divided by eight or the number of operations divided by eight plus
one. The latter condition occurs when the number of operations is not evenly divisible by
eight. If the byte count is less than one or greater than 246, or the length of the packet
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Figure 3.7: Write Multiple Coils Interpreter State Diagram
minus 67 does not equal the byte count, then the core transitions to the Error state.
Otherwise, it transitions to the ﬁrst Produce Mini Packets state.
After reading the byte count, the core transitions to the Produce Mini Packets B state.
This is due to reading the packet two bytes at a time and when the byte count is read, the
data byte is also read. For the three Produce Mini Packets states, two counters are
important. The ﬁrst is the bit counter which keeps track of which bit is being inspected.
When in Produce Mini Packets B, the bit counter is less than eight and it iterates through
the lower byte that was read. After it has interpreted eight bits, it transitions to Produce
Mini Packets C which triggers the next read from the Packet FIFO. After reading the next
two bytes, the core transitions to Produce Mini Packets A. In Produce Mini Packets A, the
bit counter is greater than eight and the upper byte of the two bytes from the packet is
interpreted. When that byte is exhausted, the state transitions to Produce Mini Packets B
and the process begins again. The second counter that is being updated through all the
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previous transitions maintains how many mini packets have been produced. The Write
Multiple Coils core produces the same write mini packets as the single write interpreter,
ﬁve bytes wide. When the current bit of data being inspected is ‘1’, the mini packet that is
created has its data ﬁeld set to 0xFF00. If the current bit inspected is ‘0’, the data ﬁeld is
set to 0x0000. Once the total number of mini packets needed to be produced are created,
the core transitions to the Operation Complete state.
If at any time during the operation of this core the Bloom ﬁlter establishes that a
command is not in the ﬁlter, the core transitions to the Error state.
3.3.1.6 Write Multiple Register Interpreter.
The Write Multiple Register Interpreter is the second of the two interpreters to
interpret one command only. The Write Multiple Holding Registers command is
structured similarly to the Write Multiple Coils command. Its function code is 0x10 and is
structured as follows: two-byte base address, two-byte number of operations, one-byte
byte count, and then byte count data bytes. Processing this command is easier than Write
Multiple Coils because the data to be written to a holding register is encoded as two bytes
rather than one bit.
Figure 3.8 shows the state diagram of the Write Multiple Register Interpreter. The
Write Multiple Register Interpreter begins operation in the Ready state. When the Packet
Decode block ﬁnishes its operation, if the extracted function code was 0x10, the ﬁnished
signal is routed to the start signal of the Write Multiple Register Interpreter. When this
signal goes high, the interpreter transitions to the Initialize state.
In the Initialize state, the Write Multiple Register Interpreter resets its internal signals
and counters before beginning processing. After one clock cycle it transitions to the Read
Address state. The next two bytes of the packet are the base address for the operation.
After they are stored for later use, the interpreter transitions to the Read Number of
Operations state. Following the base address, the next two bytes of the packet are the
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Figure 3.8: Write Multiple Holding Registers Interpreter State Diagram
number of operations to perform. This ﬁeld must not be less than one or greater than 123.
If either condition is true, the core transitions to an error state. Otherwise, the number of
operations is stored and the core transitions to the Read Byte Count state. Since each set
of data for each register is two bytes, the byte count should be equal to two times the
number of operations. If this is not true or the byte count is not equal to the size of the
packet minus 67 the core transitions to the Error state. Otherwise, it transitions to the
Produce Mini Packets state.
In the Produce Mini Packets state the interpreter continues to read from the Packet
FIFO and outputs a new mini packet at the end of each clock cycle. Once the total number
of operations mini packets are produced, the core transitions to the Operation Complete
state.
If at any time during the operation of this core the Bloom ﬁlter establishes that a
command is not in the ﬁlter, the core transitions to the Error state.
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3.3.1.7 Bloom Filters.
The Bloom ﬁlters are the crux of the command inspection in the hardware stage of
operation. Rather than taking multiple clock cycles to look up data ranges or if a
command is valid for an address, the Bloom ﬁlter can perform the lookup and verify
whether a command is invalid or probably valid.
Figure 3.9 depicts a simpliﬁed block diagram of the implemented Bloom ﬁlters. At
their core they consist of a hash matrix, ﬁve Block RAMs, and one large AND gate. The
hash matrix is set up in the same way as in Figure 2.11 where each bit of the input string
either zeros out a random vector or allows it to proceed on to the XOR gate. It is written to
be completely independent of the clock and uses ten diﬀerent H3 hash algorithms. The ten
H3 algorithms produce addresses used to look entries up in the Block RAMs. The Block
RAMs are Xilinx cores that have been conﬁgured for true dual port access, meaning two
independent lookups can be performed each clock cycle. They are also conﬁgured to be
214 bits wide, the maximum full address space of the onboard 18Kb Block RAMs. If
necessary in the future, these can be reconﬁgured to 215 bits wide and use two 18Kb Block
RAMs to make a single 36Kb Block RAM in order to lower the false positive rate. The
Block RAMs also have their contents initialized at compile time rather than loading them
after the system is running in order to simplify the design. The Bloom ﬁlter contents is
generated in Matlab [Mat14] based on enumerated valid commands.
3.3.2 Current Sense Circuit.
The current sense circuit is a key element in determining whether or not the PLC
actually executed a command sent to it. Its operation is based on Ohm’s Law, shown in
Equation 3.1. The voltage drop V across a circuit element is
V = I ∗ R (3.1)
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Figure 3.9: Simpliﬁed Bloom Filter Block Diagram
where I is the current ﬂowing through the element and R is the resistance of the element.
Since it is known that the current loop is restricted to a range between 4 mA and 20 mA,
all that remains is to use a circuit element with a known resistance. Figure 3.10 depicts the
current sense circuit with a 200 Ω current sense resistor. The resistance of 200 Ω was
chosen to provide a 0.8 V to 4 V range for the ADC to sense. If deployed with a real PLC,
the current sense resistor would be a much smaller resistance, likely in the 0.1 mΩ to 1
mΩ range, in order to minimize power dissipation. A resistor in that range is not used for
this research due to the necessity of designing signal ampliﬁcation circuitry and custom
printed circuit boards.
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Figure 3.10: Current Sense Circuit
3.3.3 ADC Bank.
The ADC Bank is a structure that provides a single point to interact with all of the
ADCs. The bank allows for control of up to ﬁve ADCs, each set to monitor a diﬀerent
line. Figure 3.11 shows a simpliﬁed block diagram of the ADC Bank.
The ADC selected for use in this design is the ADS7818p from Texas Instruments
primarily due to its ability to perform 500,000 conversions per second. The ADS7818p is
a 12-bit ADC, meaning it should be able to distinguish between 212 diﬀerent voltage levels
between 0 V and twice its reference voltage [Cor98]. For the SIEVE system, the ADCs
are set to use their internal 2.5 V internal reference, giving them an input voltage range
from 0 V to 5 V. This means that the diﬀerence between a reading of 0 and 1 (or 4 and 5,
512 and 513, and so on) is 1.22 mV. Unfortunately, the 12-bit resolution of the ADCs
restricts the SIEVE system to eight-bit analysis. Since MODBUS registers are 16 bits
wide, the ADC cannot distinguish all of the possible values that a register can take. The
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Figure 3.11: Simpliﬁed ADC Bank Block Diagram
range of analysis is further narrowed from 12 bits because a line whose data value is set to
zero is still outputting 4 mA or 0.8 V in the current sense circuit, not zero mA. This is not
a ﬂaw, it is simply the nature of current loop control and must be taken into consideration
in the design process. From this, the number of levels that the ADS7818p should be able
to distinguish is 3.2 V (4.0 V - 0.8 V) divided by 1.22 mV or 2,621 diﬀerent levels. This
range is larger than 211 but less than 212. Thus, since 16-bit and 12-bit data is not able to
be handled, the eight-bit data range was chosen.
The ADS7818p converts an analog voltage to a digital reading over the course of 16
clock cycles. The conversion takes that much time due to the chip outputting the reading
serially then requiring time to reacquire the analog voltage level. Its maximum clock rate
is 8 MHz [Cor98], much slower than the system clock rate of 125 MHz. Since a
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conversion takes 16 clock cycles and the length of an 8 MHz clock cycle is 125 ns, the
convert time is 2000 ns or 2 μs. Taking the inverse of this conversion time shows that the
maximum number of conversions per second is 500,000 or 500 KHz, the ADS7818p’s
maximum rating. This derivation shows how the number of conversions per second is
based oﬀ of the chip’s clock rate. Unfortunately, the 125 MHz main system clock rate
does not evenly divide down to 8 MHz. This means the supplied clock rate will be slightly
slower than 8 MHz, increasing the amount of time needed to convert an analog voltage.
The slow clock was derived by toggling a signal up or down every 8 main system clock
cycles. At 125 MHz, a clock cycle is 8 ns long. The derived clock rate is then
fderived =
1
16 ∗ 8 ns = 7.8125 MHz (3.2)
This equates to a conversion time of 2.048 μs or 488,281 conversions per second.
A conversion is triggered when the address in signal of the ADC (shown in
Figure 3.11) is equal to the address of the line it is monitoring. Each ADC monitors a
unique address corresponding to a speciﬁc monitored line. It is up to the operator to
ensure that the monitored addresses are unique and that only one ADC is triggered at a
time. When the ADC is triggered, the serial data is stored in the lowest bit of a shift
register and gradually shifted to the left. After 16 slow clock cycles, a ﬁnished signal goes
high and the digital reading is presented to the CPU in a register.
Since reading the current setting of the line is important, a pilot study was conducted
to determine how accurately the ADC can measure the current. This was accomplished
using two ML507 FPGA boards, one running the ADC bank (board A) and the other
running a 12 bit Digital to Analog Converter (DAC) current source (board B). After
setting DAC current source value to zero (4 mA), the ADC is queried to determine the
voltage across the current sense resistor. Next, board A signals board B to increment the
DAC current source value by 1. Five milliseconds later, the line is measured again. This
continues until the line value wraps around back to zero. This experiment is conducted
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ﬁve times. Figure 3.12 shows the averaged readings across those ﬁve experiments. It is
clear that the ADC at least matches the expected upward trend; however, it appears to fail
to provide readings that distinguish adjacent data values. The worst run of the same
average value is from data values 171 to 202, totaling to 31 values with the same readings.
The ADC also reads higher voltages than expected – 0.3 V for lower data values and 0.16
V for higher values. These inaccuracies are likely due to a circuit grounding issue..
Figure 3.12: ADC Readings for Each Data Value
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A linear model of the ADC readings was calculated using R [fSC14] and found to be
y = 682 + 10.77 ∗ x (3.3)
where x is the eight-bit data value. The linear model has an r2 value of 0.99, indicating
statistical signiﬁcance. This model is used in software to transform the ADC readings to
an approximation of the data value of the line.
3.3.4 Software.
The custom software developed for the SIEVE system is responsible for operating
the developed hardware structures, maintaining the algorithm state (i.e. a response is
expected, processing commands and responses, and logging invalid packets/sending
warnings). It is written in C and runs on the embedded PowerPC CPU.
Operation of the developed hardware structures is supported through driver ﬁles that
are automatically generated by the Xilinx software. Interaction with the structures is
established using 32-bit hardware registers. Each device uses four registers for data input,
output, status updates, and command and control. Table 3.3 shows the software registers
and their purposes for both the MODBUS Inspection Core and the ADC Bank. After
issuing a command to begin operation, stable results are obtained by continuously polling
the device status registers until they indicate the operation is complete.
Maintaining the algorithm state is done through the use of two ﬂags:
command expected and response expected. The algorithm begins operation expecting a
command to the PLC. If a valid command is received, command expected is set to zero
and response expected is set to one. Then, if a valid response from the PLC is received,
response expected is set to zero and command expected is set to one. This dual ﬂag setup
provides a means to detect communication that does not occur as expected such as a
command that is received before a response is received for the previous command.
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Table 3.3: Software Registers
Device Register Use








Command and response processing are the primary purposes of the developed
software. Since the Bloom ﬁlters have the possibility of failing to detect an invalid
command due to the false positive problem, further scrutiny is required for validation.
This is accomplished by inspecting the function code, base address, and in the case of
writing to holding registers, checking if the data is within the valid range. This is
accomplished with lookups in three ﬁles stored in the ML507’s SRAM module. The
SRAM module has 1 MB of storage and faster access times than the DDR2 SDRAM.
After a command has been returned as a valid from the MODBUS Inspection Core, the
software takes over inspection. First, the function code is extracted in order to determine
how to inspect the remaining ﬁelds. Once the correct routine is determined, a lookup is
performed based on the data construct that the command is operating on and the base
address to ﬁnd which actions can be performed at that address. For read commands,
inspection stops here as a read at an address is either allowed or not allowed. Write
commands undergo further inspection. For coils, only the Write Single Coil command has
further inspection because its data ﬁeld is deﬁned as either being 0xFF00 or 0x0000. If the
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data ﬁeld is anything other than those two values, the command is determined to be
suspicious. Further inspection is not necessary for Write Multiple Coils because the data
is packed as single bits rather than two bytes. The bits can only be one of two values, both
of which are valid for coils. For holding registers, two lookups are performed to determine
the lowest value that can be written and the highest value that can be written. If the data is
out of this range, the command is determined to be suspicious.
Response processing is simpler than command processing yet more diﬃcult to
accomplish. The main issue with processing MODBUS/TCP responses is that they do not
always have all of the information needed to properly interpret them. Table 3.4 shows the
response formats for the commands implemented for the SIEVE system. Of the eight
commands, only two responses (Write Single Coil and Write Single Holding Register)
contain enough information for processing without consulting the command. Thus, after a
valid command has been processed it must be stored for use when processing the
response. In all cases, the base address for inspection and number of operations are loaded
from the previous command. Next, a counter is set up to iterate over all addresses aﬀected
by the command. If one of those addresses matches a monitored address, a list of which is
stored in the program, the ADC connected to that address’ corresponding line is queried.
The result returned, however, is a 12-bit encoding of the voltage drop across the 200 Ω
current sense resistor. Using the linear model found in Section 3.3.3 the returned result is
converted to an approximation of the original data value. However, due to the inaccuracies
of the ADC as shown in Section 3.3.3, a range of values must be considered for the
calculated data value. Given that the worst run equivalent values was determined to be 32
values long, as long as the calculated value is within ±15 of the command’s data value for
writes or response’s data value for reads, the response is accepted.
Packets are logged using the libpcap format. This ﬁle format is readable by both
Wireshark [Wir14b] and tcpdump [Tcp14], two widely-used packet capture programs.
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Packets are stored in a binary format and are timestamped with a 32-bit seconds ﬁeld and
a 32-bit microseconds ﬁeld [Wir14a]. The log ﬁle is maintained in the oﬀ FPGA DDR
SDRAM due to the large storage capacity (256 MB) it oﬀers. When an operator wants to
inspect the log ﬁle, it is copied to a compact ﬂash card that can be removed and read by
another computer. Reporting that a packet has been logged due to being suspicious is
accomplished by sending a text message across RS232 that is read on another user
operated computer.
Table 3.4: Response Formats
Function Code Command Response Format
0x01 Read Coils Byte count followed by data
0x02 Read Discrete Inputs Byte count followed by data
0x03 Read Holding Registers Byte count followed by data
0x04 Read Input Registers Byte count followed by data
0x05 Write Single Coil Echo of command
0x06 Write Single Register Echo of command
0x0F Write Multiple Coils Base address written followed by
number of coils written
0x10 Write Multiple Holding Registers Base address written followed by
number of registers written
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IV. Methodology
This chapter covers the methodology used to test and evaluate the SIEVE system.Section 4.1 covers the goals and hypothesis of the research, Section 4.2 covers the
boundaries of the System Under Test (SUT), Section 4.3 covers the services the SIEVE
system provides, Section 4.4 covers the workloads used to drive the SUT, Section 4.6
covers the parameters of the SIEVE system, Section 4.7 covers the factors varied during
the evaluation of the SIEVE system, Section 4.8 covers the evaluation techniques of the
experiment, Section 4.9 covers the experimental design, and Section 4.10 summarizes the
experiment.
4.1 Goals and Hypothesis
The goal of this research is to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the SIEVE system that
veriﬁes the integrity of incoming traﬃc to a PLC and the integrity of the PLC’s operations.
The success of this system will be evaluated like that of an intrusion detection system. It is
evaluated by its ability to successfully verify the integrity of the network traﬃc and device
actions. A system that fails to perform these actions is inadequate. In SCADA
applications, this service cannot impact normal device operation and needs to be fast
enough to identify an action (incoming command or device response) that is not valid as
soon as it happens. The hypothesis of this research is that the SIEVE system is able to
verify the integrity of 100% of incoming network traﬃc and PLC responses in realtime,
that is complete inspection and, if necessary, logging of packets in 5 ms or 200 command
per second frequency. The 5 ms requirement is derived from the speciﬁcations of
Allen-Bradley PLCs in [Roc12]. The most common analog scan time for these PLCs is 10
ms. Halving that scan time as a goal results in a goal inspection time of 5 ms. The
secondary goal of the research is also to determine whether Bloom ﬁlters provide any
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beneﬁts in identiﬁcation of invalid commands. Since Bloom ﬁlters only return negative
lookup results for commands that are not inserted into them, the hypothesis for this goal is
that for invalid MODBUS/TCP commands a well tuned Bloom ﬁlter will reduce the
amount of time needed for processing.
4.2 System Boundaries
The SUT, also referred to as the Remote Device Integrity Veriﬁcation
System (RDIVS), consists of an emulated PLC and the SIEVE system. Figure 4.1 shows
the block diagram of the SUT. In the RDIVS, the emulated PLC reports or modiﬁes its
state based on commands received from the MTU – performing basic SCADA operations.
The use of an emulated PLC instead of a real one is covered in Section 4.8 and Design and
operation of the emulated PLC is covered in Appendix B. The SIEVE system is the
Component Under Test (CUT) and implements the speciﬁcations-based integrity
veriﬁcation algorithm. The SUT does not include the MTU or devices being controlled or
read from.
Figure 4.1: Remote Device Integrity Veriﬁcation System (RDIVS)
57
4.3 System Services
Integrity veriﬁcation is the primary service provided by the RDIVS. This service
takes the commands sent to the system as input and responds based on the change in state
of the PLC. Two outcomes are identiﬁed for this service, and they are doing nothing or
sending an alert. Doing nothing occurs when the received commands are correctly replied
to by the PLC, in this case changing system state or truthfully responding its state.
Sending an alert happens when the PLC does not reply correctly to the received command
(e.g., changing to an incorrect state or falsifying its state to the MTU). Each outcome can
also be invoked through improper behavior of the CUT.
4.4 Workload
The workload to the system is a series of commands from the MTU to the PLC and
responses from the PLC to the MTU. Three workloads are generated: a valid
MODBUS/TCP workload, an invalid command MODBUS/TCP workload, and a
non-MODBUS/TCP workload. The commands are sent to the system via Ethernet in
MODBUS/TCP packets at regular intervals, mimicking the characteristics of a SCADA
network.
The primary characteristics of the workload is the command types, their length, and
the interval at which they are sent. Command type is chosen as it ties directly into the
complexity of the CUT in that implementing more commands means more hardware
structures and perhaps more time to interpret them. In an active SCADA network, the
majority of these commands are reads from or writes to coils and registers. Command
length is how many operations are performed per command. This aﬀects performance in
that each operation must be scrutinized in order to determine validity, thus more
operations means a higher processing time. Lastly, the interval between packets also has a
large impact on the CUT. Since all packet inspections and ADC queries must happen
between command packets, if command packets arrive faster than the SIEVE system can
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process them the receive buﬀers could ﬁll up. If a packet arrives when the receive buﬀers
are full, it is dropped. If 100% of packets cannot be inspected, the CUT fails the test.
4.4.1 Valid MODBUS/TCP Workload.
The valid MODBUS/TCP workload consists of MODBUS/TCP commands that are
well deﬁned for the PLC. This means that all of the commands sent in this workload can
be executed correctly and without error by the PLC. Table 4.1 lays out the commands and
their lengths. Each command and response was generated using Triangle MicroWorks’
SCADA Test Harness program [TM14]. Read Discrete Inputs and Read Input Registers
commands and responses are not included in the workload because they are functionally
identical to Read Coils and Read Holding Registers.
Table 4.1: Valid Commands and Responses
Command Function Code Number of Operations
Read Coil 0x01 Minimum (1)
Maximum (2000)
Read Holding Register 0x03 Minimum(1)
Maximum(125)
Write Single Coil 0x05 1
Write Single Holding Register 0x06 1
Write Multiple Coils 0x0F Minimum (1)
Maximum (1968)
Write Multiple Holding Registers 0x10 Minimum(1)
Maximum(123)
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4.4.2 Invalid MODBUS/TCP Workload.
The invalid MODBUS/TCP workload consists of all of the commands from the valid
workload except modiﬁed to be invalid for the PLC. This means that execution of the
command is not deﬁned for the PLC, that is, it will return a MODBUS Exception
Response PDU rather than a MODBUS Response PDU, or execute an undeﬁned action.
The commands are made to be invalid by modifying the base address ﬁeld to be an invalid
address for the emulated PLC. This was done using a hexadecimal editor and conﬁrmed in
Wireshark [Wir14b]. Modifying the base address of the command allows for ﬁne tuning
of the amount of processing needed to determine that the command is invalid. For
commands that perform one operation, such as Write Single Coil, the invalid address is
the ﬁrst and only operation inspected. For the maximum length commands, such as Read
Coils with a length of 2000, the invalid address could be the ﬁrst address operated on, the
last address operated on, or somewhere in the middle. Table 4.2 lays out the workload by
command, number of operations, and when the invalid address will be invoked.
4.4.3 Non-MODBUS/TCP Workload.
A non-MODBUS/TCP workload for the SUT could be made up of any number of
diﬀerent packet types as long as they are not MODBUS/TCP. For a more real world
approach, a port scan of a PLC was determined to be suitable for this workload. A
problem with this though is that the emulated PLC used in the SUT does not have an IP
stack. Thus the non-MODBUS/TCP workload is a Zenmap [Mar14] port scan of an
Omron CP1L PLC that was recorded using Wireshark [Wir14b] and replayed using
Tcpreplay [Tur14]. Every packet in this workload is undeﬁned by deﬁnition for the
emulated PLC. Zenmap was setup to perform a default port scan of the PLC with the
command
nmap -T4 -A -v
The ﬁrst 50 synchronization requests and responses are used for the workload.
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Table 4.2: Invalid Commands and Responses
Command Number of Operations Invalid Location
Read Coil Minimum (1) N/A
Maximum (2000) Best (1)
Maximum (2000) Worst (2000)
Read Holding Register Minimum(1) N/A
Maximum(125) Best (1)
Maximum(125) Worst (125)
Write Single Coil 1 N/A
Write Single Holding Register 1 N/A
Write Multiple Coils Minimum (1) N/A
Maximum (1968) Best (1)
Maximum (1968) Worst (1968)




The command frequency dictates how quickly the CUT must process both the
command packet and response packet. Since the SIEVE system has a ﬁnite amount of
memory to store received packets, it must process them fast enough such that packets do
not drop. Four frequencies are used: 200 commands per second, Valid Operation Break,
Invalid Command - Saturated Break, and 5000 commands per second. The ﬁrst frequency,
200 commands per second, corresponds to a 5 ms interval between packets and is the rate
at which the SUT must be able to inspect and log all packets. Valid Operation Break is a
command frequency which is higher than 200 commands per second and causes the SUT
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to process the Valid MODBUS/TCP workload incorrectly. Invalid Command - Saturated
Break is a command frequency which is higher than Valid Operation Break that causes the
SUT to incorrectly process the Invalid MODBUS/TCP workload when the Bloom ﬁlters
are saturated. Lastly, 5000 commands per second is the fastest that the emulated PLC is
able to respond correctly to MODBUS/TCP commands.
4.5 Performance Metrics
Metrics recorded for the SUT are command processing time, response processing
time, total processing time, count of packets inspected, and count of packets logged. The
ﬁrst three metrics are used to determine how long it takes the CUT to process a packet
while the latter two valid the correct and accurate operation of the CUT.
The command processing time metric is the time it takes the CUT to completely
process a packet sent to the PLC, while response processing time is the time it takes the
CUT to completely process a packet sent from the PLC. For both metrics, time begins
upon complete receipt of the packet by the CUT. This is determined by the receive FIFO
of the CUT reporting that a packet has been received. Time also ends for both metrics
upon complete veriﬁcation of the validity of the packet or logging the packet and sending
a warning. The diﬀerence between the two metrics is the type of packet being processed.
The third metric, total processing time, is derived from the command processing time
and response processing time. It is the addition of the two aforementioned metrics for
corresponding commands and responses and represents the total amount of time required
by the CUT to process a conversation between the MTU and the PLC. Total processing
time, tprocessing time, is deﬁned as
tprocessing time = tcommand + tresponse (4.1)
where tcommand is the command processing time and tresponse is the response processing
time.
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The count of packets inspected and count of packets logged are both measures of the
CUT’s inspection abilities. The count of packets inspected is incremented every time a
packet is inspected by the CUT whereas the count of packets logged is incremented only
when a packet is logged. The ﬁrst measures the system’s ability to process packets in a
timely fashion while the second measures the system’s ability to discern valid packets
from invalid packets. If the count of packets inspected is less than the number of packets
actually sent, then the CUT is dropping packets. For the Valid MODBUS/TCP workload
the count of logged packets should be equal to zero since every packet is well deﬁned for
the emulated PLC. For all other workloads, the count of logged packets should be equal to
the total number of packets sent since every packet should be logged.
4.6 System Parameters
The following parameters aﬀect system performance.
4.6.1 Communication Protocol.
The communication protocol between the SUT and MTU is the language that both
devices speak to each other. Since every communication protocol utilizes diﬀerent
arrangements of bits in the control packets, interpretation can be more or less complex
depending on the implementation. The communication protocol used in the experiment is
MODBUS/TCP.
4.6.2 Communication Medium.
The communication medium between the SUT and MTU is the means by which the
two communicate. The medium implemented can greatly aﬀect network latency as some
are slower than others. Mediums capable of higher transmission speeds mean more time is
available to update the system image and verify PLC output. The communication medium
used in the experiment is Ethernet.
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4.6.3 MODBUS Functions Implemented.
Depending on how a PLC is used in a SCADA network, diﬀerent commands will
produce diﬀerent results. Depending on the PLC model, some commands may not be
implemented at all and have an undeﬁned eﬀect on the system. This parameter aﬀects
performance in that the number of functions implemented makes the inspection hardware
and software more complex. The emulated PLC implements all of the MODBUS/TCP
commands shown in Table 4.1. It has 2000 discrete inputs, 2000 coils (addresses 0x0000 -
0x07CF) and 125 holding registers and input registers (addresses 0x0000 - 007C) deﬁned.
All of the aforementioned addresses are valid for reading and writing using commands
that perform multiple operations (e.g. Write Multiple Coils). Commands that perform one
operation only, such as Write Single Coil, are valid only for address 0x0000 for coils and
holding registers. Holding registers are also conﬁgured for two data values only: 20 and
120. The total number of valid read commands is 4250 (2000 Discrete Inputs + 2000
Coils + 125 Holding Registers + 125 Input Registers) and the total number of valid write
commands is 4254 (2*(2000 Coils) + 2*(125 Holding Registers) + 2*(1 Coil) + 2*(1
Holding Register)).
4.6.4 FPGA.
The FPGA upon which the IDS is implemented has limits according to its clock
speed, microprocessor used, and amount of custom hardware that can be implemented. As
the virtual system model becomes more complex, more FPGA fabric will need to be used
to implement the custom hardware. If the system becomes too complex, the model may
not be maintainable by the FPGA. The FPGA used in the CUT is a Xilinx XC5VFX70T.
4.7 Factors
The following are diﬀerent factors and their levels used to evaluate the performance
of the speciﬁcations-based integrity veriﬁcation algorithm. Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 lay out
the factors and levels for each of the three experiments.
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4.7.1 Number of Lines Monitored.
The number of lines monitored aﬀects how many ADC queries are required. The two
levels identiﬁed are the minimum number of monitored lines (1) and maximum number of
monitored lines (5) for the CUT.
4.7.2 Infection Status of PLC.
The infection status of a PLC will indicate whether commands are followed or
requests for data falsiﬁed. In the case of an infected PLC, alerts would be expected to be
raised based on PLC responses. The two levels are not infected and infected.
4.7.3 Infected Line Address Location.
The infected line’s address location aﬀects performance for commands that perform
multiple operations. The best location for a command would be the ﬁrst address checked
whereas the worst location would be the last address in a series of operations. The two
levels are best and worst.
4.7.4 Bloom Filter False Positive Rate.
The Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate will determine whether an invalid command is
caught in hardware or software. Since the rate diﬀers based on the hash functions used,
commands implemented for the PLC, and size of the block RAM components, two levels
are identiﬁed. The ﬁrst level corresponds to a properly conﬁgured Bloom ﬁlter whose
false positive rate is not equal to 100%, referred to as non-saturated. Using the command
counts derived in Section 4.6.3 (n=4250 or 4254), the Bloom ﬁlter widths (m=214) and
number of hash functions (k=10) from Section 3.3.1.7, and Equation 2.1, the
non-saturated false positive rate for the read command Bloom ﬁlter is 2.11% and 2.14%
for the write command Bloom ﬁlter. The second level corresponds to a saturated Bloom
ﬁlter which reports all queries as being present. This was accomplished by setting all
entries in both the read command and write command Bloom ﬁlters to ‘1’.
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Table 4.3: Experiment 1 Factors and Levels
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Workload Valid Invalid Non
MODBUS/TCP MODBUS/TCP MODBUS/TCP
Bloom Filter False Positive Rate Non-saturated Saturated
Table 4.4: Experiment 2 Factors and Levels
Factor Level 1 Level 2
PLC Infection Status Not Infected Infected
Infected Location Best Worst
Number of Lines Monitored 1 5
Table 4.5: Experiment 3 Factors and Levels
Factor Level 1 Level 2
Workload Worst Case Valid Worst Case
Command and Response Invalid Command
PLC Infection Status Not Infected Infected
Bloom Filter False Positive Rate Non-saturated Saturated
Command Frequency 200 Commands Valid Operation Break
per Second
Level 3 Level 4
Worst Case Non-MODBUS/TCP
Infected Response
Invalid Command 5000 Commands
Saturated Break per Second
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4.8 Evaluation Technique
To evaluate the system direct measurement is used with PLC emulation. No
analytical model exists for this application, and a simulation would be diﬃcult to create
for such a complex system. Testing the system in an emulated environment should provide
results reﬂective of an active environment. Validation of the integrity veriﬁcation
capability of the system is accomplished by using either a purely valid workload or purely
invalid workload, in which case either all packets are not logged or logged. This ensures
all input types are investigated.
PLC emulation is chosen as an alternative to using an actual PLC due to the infected
PLC factor. Achieving the infected factor level is diﬃcult with an actual PLC because
PLCs cannot falsify their line status without being legitimately infected by malware such
as Stuxnet. To do so could result in permanent damage to the device and would require
precise control over how the malware operates. Emulation is achieved using an FPGA
development board running a simple software loop that drives the DACs and sends a
response from a list based on the command it receives. It will perform no other processing.
Figure 4.2 shows a block diagram of the experimental setup and consists of the
following:
• 1 Cisco 24-port gigabit Ethernet Switch (model WS-C3560G-24PS-S) conﬁgured
with two SPAN ports.
• 1 HP 8570W laptop running Backtrack 5 R3 and Tcpreplay acting as the MTU,
connected to a normal port on the switch.
• 1 Xilinx ML507 Board Revision A Virtex 5 development board acting as the
emulated PLC, connected to a normal port on the switch.
• 5 AD5410 Digital to Analog Current Source ICs to act as inputs or outputs to the
emulated PLC.
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• 1 Xilinx ML507 Board Revision A Virtex 5 development board as the CUT,
connected to a SPAN port on the switch.
• 5 ADS7818 Analog to Digital Converter ICs. These chips are used by the CUT to
monitor the PLCs inputs or outputs.
• Asus G73J laptop running Windows 7. This laptop uses two RS232 connections to
monitor the state of the CUT and emulated PLC and is also connected to the other
SPAN port on the switch in order to monitor the experiments.
Figure 4.2: Experiment Block Diagram
A photo of the actual experimental setup is shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Experimental Setup
4.8.1 Experiment 1.
The purpose of experiment 1 is to determine packet processing time for command
packets. In this experiment, 50 packets of each command type from each workload in
Section 4.4 are sent to the emulated PLC from the HP 8570W using Tcpreplay [Tur14].
The commands are sent at a rate of 200 packets per second, corresponding to one
command every 5 ms. As the commands are sent, the command processing time is
recorded by the CUT. Sending 50 packets was determined to provide suﬃciently small
conﬁdence intervals. Additionally, ﬁve commands are sent prior to recording the
command processing time in order to “warm up” the board by caching instructions and
necessary data.
4.8.2 Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 is accomplished in much the same way as Experiment 1. In this case,
however, only the valid MODBUS/TCP command workload is used. Commands are again
sent to the emulated PLC using Tcpreplay [Tur14] at a rate of 200 commands per second,
however response processing time is recorded instead of command processing time. The
infected PLC factor level is achieved by modifying the emulated PLC to drive the DACs
to a value that does not match the received command.
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4.8.3 Experiment 3.
The goal of experiment 3 is determine the SIEVE system’s ability to process packets
based on the worst case total processing time from each workload and command
frequency. The count of packets inspected and count of packets logged are recorded for
this experiment. The worst case total processing time is determined based on the results of
Experiments 1 and 2. The command frequencies chosen are also based oﬀ of the results of
Experiments 1 and 2 and should cause the CUT to not perform optimally. The experiment
is run by sending 5000 commands to the emulated PLC which should in turn reply with
5000 responses, resulting in a total of 10000 packets being examined. The workloads will
either be purely invalid or valid, meaning all packets should logged or not logged.
4.9 Experimental Design
The ﬁrst experiment is a partial factorial design and uses all four workloads speciﬁed
above and varies the bloom ﬁlter false positive rate for the invalid MODBUS/TCP
workload and non-MODBUS/TCP workload. The false positive rate is not varied for the
valid workload because the commands pass through no matter what. The experimental
scenarios used for this experiment are listed in Appendix A. Three replications are
performed in order to reduce the variance in the data. The total number of trials is
therefore 3 repetitions*(50 commands*(10 valid commands+14 invalid commands*2
bloom ﬁlter levels + 1 non-MODBUS/TCP*2 bloom ﬁlter levels))=6000. A one variable
t-test is performed in order to determine the mean command processing time, the standard
deviation, standard error, and 95% conﬁdence interval.
The second experiment is a partial factorial design and uses the valid MODBUS/TCP
command workload. The factors varied will be the number of lines monitored and the
infection status of the PLC totaling to 36 scenarios (listed in Appendix A). The total
number of trials is 3 repetitions * 50 packets * 36 scenarios = 5400. A one variable t-test
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is performed in order to determine the mean response processing time, the standard
deviation, standard error, and 95% conﬁdence interval.
The third experiment is a partial factorial design and uses the worst case exchanges
for each workload type and varies command frequency. This should determine how the
CUT responds as command frequency increases according to the workload. The
experiment will consist of 3 repetitions * 10000 packets * 4 command frequencies * 4
workloads * 2 Bloom ﬁlter false positive rates = 960000 trials. A one variable t-test is
performed in order to determine the 95% conﬁdence intervals for the count of packets
intercepted and the count of packets logged.
4.10 Methodology Summary
SCADA networks are involved in many critical infrastructure applications. As these
networks are increasingly connected to the Internet, more and more opportunities come
into existence for exploitation. Protection of these networks is diﬃcult due to their unique
operating behaviors and limited resources, necessitating a new approach to defense. The
purpose of this research is to investigate a speciﬁcations-based integrity veriﬁcation
technique to defend these vulnerable networks. The expected result is that this technique
is scalable to the system and can operate within realtime constraints.
This chapter introduces the methods by which the experimental goal is fulﬁlled. The
bounds of the system are established and performance metrics introduced. Three partial
factorial experiment are introduced that determine command processing time, response




Tthis chapter presents the results and analyses of the three experiments. Section 5.1covers the results of Experiment 1. Section 5.2 covers the results of Experiment 2.
Lastly, Section 5.3 covers the results of Experiment 3.
5.1 Results and Analysis of Experiment 1
This section presents the results of experiment 1. Results are presented both in
tabular format with speciﬁc notation to denote the measured command. First the
command type is stated, then command length if applicable, and lastly invalid address
location if applicable. An example for a maximum length valid Read Coils command is
Read Coils Max. An invalid maximum length Read Coils command with the invalid
address in the worst location is denoted Read Coils Max Worst.
5.1.1 Valid MODBUS/TCP Workload.
Table 5.1 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the valid
MODBUS/TCP commands that operate on coils. The table contains the number of
packets sent, the mean CPU cycles, the standard deviation, the standard error of the mean,
and the 95% conﬁdence interval. The table is ordered by mean CPU cycles, equating to
command processing time. The range of mean command processing time for commands
that operate on coils is 2528.893 to 99550.633 cycles.
Table 5.2 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the valid
MODBUS/TCP commands that operate on holding registers. The table contains the
number of packets sent, the mean CPU cycles, the standard deviation, the standard error of
the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence interval. The table is ordered by mean CPU cycles,
equating to command processing time. The range of mean command processing time for
commands that operate on holding registers is 2256.947 to 23897.107 cycles.
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Table 5.1: Valid Command Processing Times - Coils
Command Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Write Single Coil 50 2528.893 1.777 0.145 (2528.607, 2529.180)
Read Coils Min 50 2551.307 2.838 0.232 (2550.849, 2551.765)
Write Multi Coil Min 50 2629.660 4.096 0.334 (2628.999, 2630.321)
Read Coils Max 50 92509.953 41.791 3.412 (92503.211, 92516.696)
Write Multi Coil Max 50 99550.633 90.833 7.417 (99535.978, 99565.288)
Table 5.2: Valid Command Processing Times - Holding Registers
Command Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Read HR Min 50 2556.947 1.809 0.148 (2556.655, 2557.239)
Write Single HR 50 2582.213 10.369 0.847 (2580.540, 2583.886)
Write Multi HR Min 50 2726.927 8.407 0.686 (2725.570, 2728.283)
Read HR Max 50 8271.887 3.519 0.287 (8271.319, 8272.454)
Write Multi HR Max 50 23897.107 31.039 2.534 (23892.099, 23902.115)
Overall, for the valid MODBUS/TCP workload it becomes clear that minimal length
commands, that is performing one operation, all have very similar command processing
times. Maximum length write commands, for both coils and holding registers, both
require more time than their maximum length read counterparts. This is despite maximum
length reads performing more operations (2000 operations compared to 1968 operations
for coils). For coils this is likely due to a combination of the additional Produce Mini
Packets state in the MODBUS Inspection Core combined with the fact that the maximum
length Write Multiple Coils command is 313 bytes wide and takes longer to copy across
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the system than the 66 byte maximum length Read Coils. For holding registers it is likely
due more to the overhead of two additional memory lookups for the data range than copy
latencies. Diﬀerences between maximal length commands for coils and holding registers
is due to the sheer number of operations performed in coil commands compared to
holding registers (2000 reads for coils and 125 reads for holding registers).
5.1.2 Invalid MODBUS/TCP Workload.
Table 5.3 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the invalid
MODBUS/TCP commands that operate on coils in a system with non-saturated Bloom
ﬁlters. The table contains the number of packets sent, the mean CPU cycles, the standard
deviation, the standard error of the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence interval. The table is
ordered by mean CPU cycles, equating to command processing time. The range of mean
command processing time for commands that operate on coils is 1799.167 to 7853.620
cycles.
Table 5.3: Invalid Command Processing Times - Non-saturated Bloom Filter - Coils
Command Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Write Single Coil 50 1799.167 26.183 2.138 (1794.942, 1803.391)
Read Coils Min 50 1799.267 26.458 2.160 (1794.998, 1803.535)
Read Coils Max Best 50 1799.300 26.721 2.182 (1794.989, 1803.611)
Write Multi Coil Min 50 1832.060 20.373 1.663 (1828.773, 1835.347)
Read Coils Max Worst 50 3781.980 26.147 2.135 (3777.761, 3786.199)
Write Multi Coil Max Best 50 5427.767 100.128 8.175 (5411.612, 5443.921)
Write Multi Coil Max Worst 50 7853.620 75.425 6.158 (7841.451, 7865.789)
Table 5.4 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the invalid
MODBUS/TCP commands that operate on holding registers in a system with
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non-saturated Bloom ﬁlters. The table contains the number of packets sent, the mean CPU
cycles, the standard deviation, the standard error of the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence
interval. The table is ordered by mean CPU cycles, equating to command processing time.
The range of mean command processing time for commands that operate on coils is
1799.04 to 5490.093 cycles.
Table 5.4: Invalid Command Processing Times - H. Registers - Non-saturated Bloom Filter
Command Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Read HR Max Best 50 1799.040 26.151 2.135 (1794.821, 1803.259)
Write Single HR 50 1799.093 26.823 2.190 (1794.766, 1803.421)
Read HR Min 50 1799.333 26.589 2.171 (1795.043, 1803.623)
Write Multi HR Min 50 1866.780 38.051 3.107 (1860.641, 1872.919)
Read HR Max Worst 50 1925.593 24.845 2.029 (1921.585, 1929.602)
Write Multi HR Max Best 50 5424.013 76.642 6.258 (5411.648, 5436.379)
Write Multi HR Max Worst 50 5490.093 46.230 3.775 (5482.635, 5497.552)
Table 5.5 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the invalid
MODBUS/TCP commands that operate on coils in a system with saturated Bloom ﬁlters.
The table contains the number of packets sent, the mean CPU cycles, the standard
deviation, the standard error of the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence interval. The table is
ordered by mean CPU cycles, equating to command processing time. The range of mean
command processing time for commands that operate on coils is 1880.207 to 96438.433
cycles.
Table 5.6 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the invalid
MODBUS/TCP commands that operate on coils in a system with saturated Bloom ﬁlters.
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Table 5.5: Invalid Command Processing Times - Coils - Saturated Bloom Filter
Command Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Write Single Coil 50 1880.207 20.339 1.661 (1876.925, 1883.488)
Read Coils Min 50 1921.727 55.202 4.507 (1912.820, 1930.633)
Write Multi Coil Min 50 1970.847 28.393 2.318 (1966.266, 1975.428)
Read Coils Max Best 50 3865.567 24.366 1.989 (3861.635, 3869.498)
Write Multi Coil Max Best 50 7921.587 79.199 6.467 (7908.809, 7934.365)
Read Coils Max Worst 50 91828.733 48.199 3.935 (91820.957, 91836.510)
Write Multi Coil Max Worst 50 96438.433 119.637 9.768 (96419.131, 96457.736)
The table contains the number of packets sent, the mean CPU cycles, the standard
deviation, the standard error of the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence interval. The table is
ordered by mean CPU cycles, equating to command processing time. The range of mean
command processing time for commands that operate on coils is 1899.820 to 20698.633
cycles.
Table 5.6: Invalid Command Processing Times - H. Registers - Saturated Bloom Filter
Command Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Read HR Min 50 1899.820 25.918 2.116 (1895.638, 1904.002)
Write Single HR 50 1925.313 20.523 1.676 (1922.002, 1928.625)
Write Multi HR Min 50 1977.827 40.836 3.334 (1971.238, 1984.415)
Read HR Max Best 50 2055.700 55.924 4.566 (2046.677, 2064.723)
Write Multi HR Max Best 50 5653.993 114.679 9.364 (5635.491, 5672.496)
Read HR Max Worst 50 7623.607 55.437 4.526 (7614.662, 7632.551)
Write Multi HR Max Worst 50 20698.633 58.975 4.815 (20689.118, 20708.148)
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Much like the valid MODBUS/TCP workload, single operation commands have
similar processing times and commands with more operations take longer. However,
diﬀerences are apparent when comparing command processing times between the system
with non-saturated Bloom ﬁlters and the system with saturated Bloom ﬁlters. In all cases,
the non-saturated Bloom ﬁlter system performs better. A two sample t-test was performed
on the diﬀerences between the two systems. Table 5.7 displays for each invalid command
the mean CPU cycles for the non-saturated Bloom ﬁlter system, the saturated Bloom ﬁlter
system, the diﬀerence between the mean CPU cycles of the systems, the 95% conﬁdence
interval for the diﬀerence between the means, and the p-value for the diﬀerence between
the means. For every case, the p-value is extremely small, never larger than 5.899e-56.
The range of diﬀerences is as low as 81.04 and as high as 88584.813 clock cycles equating
to a time savings of 648.32 ns to 708.679 μs. The improvement of execution time for the
non-saturated Bloom ﬁlter over the saturated Bloom ﬁlter ranges from 4.5% for the Write
Single Coil command to 2328.06% for a maximum length Read Coils command with the
invalid address in the worst location.
5.1.3 Non-MODBUS/TCP Workload.
Table 5.8 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the
non-MODBUS/TCP workload for systems with non-saturated Bloom ﬁlters and saturated
Bloom ﬁlters. The table contains the number of packets sent, the mean CPU cycles, the
standard deviation, the standard error of the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence interval. The
table is ordered by mean CPU cycles, equating to command processing time. The range of
mean command processing time for commands that operate on coils is 1337.507 to
1337.933 cycles.
Non-MODBUS/TCP command processing times are overall very low. It also appears
that whether the Bloom ﬁlter is saturated or not has no eﬀect on the processing time. This
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Table 5.7: Bloom ﬁlter Saturation Command Processing Time Diﬀerences
Command Mean Mean Diﬀerence Conﬁdence Interval p-value
Type CPU Cycles CPU Cycles Between of Diﬀerence Between
Non-saturated Saturated Means Means (95%)
Write Single Coil 1799.167 1880.207 81.040 (75.711, 86.369) 2.246e-89
Read HR Min 1799.333 1899.820 100.487 (94.520, 106.453) 6.198e-102
Write Multi HR Min 1866.780 1977.827 111.047 (102.078, 120.016) 9.233e-73
Read Coils Min 1799.267 1921.727 122.460 (112.608, 132.312) 5.005e-64
Write Single HR 1799.093 1925.313 126.220 (120.792, 131.648) 1.018e-131
Write Multi Coil Min 1832.060 1970.847 138.787 (133.169, 144.404) 1.084e-135
Write Multi HR Max Best 5424.013 5653.993 229.980 (207.803, 252.157) 5.899e-56
Read HR Max Best 1799.040 2055.700 256.660 (246.723, 266.597) 1.468e-120
Read Coils Max Best 1799.300 3865.567 2066.267 (2060.456, 2072.078) 0.000e+00
Write Multi Coil Max Best 5427.767 7921.587 2493.820 (2473.302, 2514.338) 0.000e+00
Read HR Max Worst 1925.593 7623.607 5698.013 (5688.234, 5707.792) 0.000e+00
Write Multi HR Max Worst 5490.093 20698.633 15208.540 (15196.496, 15220.584) 0.000e+00
Read Coils Max Worst 3781.980 91828.733 88046.753 (88037.932, 88055.575) 0.000e+00
Write Multi Coil Max Worst 7853.620 96438.433 88584.813 (88562.071, 88607.556) 0.000e+00
Table 5.8: Non-MODBUS/TCP Processing Time
Command Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Non Modbus BF Saturated 50 1337.507 21.882 1.787 (1333.976, 1341.037)
Non Modbus BF Not Saturated 50 1337.933 22.976 1.876 (1334.226, 1341.640)
makes sense as the commands are identiﬁed as not being MODBUS/TCP well before they
would be dissected and processed through the Bloom ﬁlters.
5.1.4 Overall Analysis of Experiment 1.
Between workloads, similarities become apparent. Commands that perform multiple
operations take longer than commands that perform one operation. Maximum length
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writes also take longer than their maximum length read counterparts. This is due to the
additional processing that writes perform. The command that takes the longest time to
process is the valid maximum length Write Multiple Coils command at 99550.633 clock
cycles. In the 125 MHz system, this equates to 796.4 μs. Its invalid counterpart in the
saturated Bloom ﬁlter system takes 96438.433 clock cycles or 771.5 μs. This diﬀerence is
likely because the valid command is copied byte by byte for later usage whereas the
invalid command is logged at a higher speed by copying four bytes at a time. In each of
these cases, the processing time is under 1 ms, leaving a 4 ms leeway in order to process
the relevant responses.
5.2 Results and Analysis of Experiment 2
This section presents the results of experiment 2. Results are presented in tabular
format with notation the same as in Section 5.1.
5.2.1 Valid MODBUS/TCP Workload.
Table 5.9 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the valid
MODBUS/TCP response workload for commands that operate on coils. The table
contains the number of packets sent, the mean CPU cycles, the standard deviation, the
standard error of the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence interval. The table is ordered by mean
CPU cycles, equating to response processing time. The range of mean command
processing time for commands that operate on coils is 1549.320 to 294558.253 cycles.
Table 5.10 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the valid
MODBUS/TCP response workload for commands that operate on holding registers. The
table contains the number of packets sent, the mean CPU cycles, the standard deviation,
the standard error of the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence interval. The table is ordered by
mean CPU cycles, equating to response processing time. The range of mean command
processing time for commands that operate on coils is 1500.320 to 22332.380 cycles.
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Table 5.9: Valid Response Processing Times - Coils
Command Lines Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Monitored Received CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Write Single Coil 1 50 1549.320 3.940 0.322 (1548.684, 1549.956)
Read Coils Min 1 50 1600.340 3.941 0.322 (1599.704, 1600.976)
Write Multi Coil Min 1 50 1602.340 3.941 0.322 (1601.704, 1602.976)
Read Coils Max 1 50 287937.053 7.547 0.616 (287935.836, 287938.271)
Read Coils Max 5 50 289766.567 4.543 0.371 (289765.834, 289767.300)
Write Multi Coil Max 1 50 292730.253 3.914 0.320 (292729.622, 292730.885)
Write Multi Coil Max 5 50 294558.253 3.914 0.320 (294557.622, 294558.885)
Table 5.10: Valid Response Processing Times - Holding Registers
Command Lines Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Monitored Received CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Write Single HR 1 50 1500.320 3.883 0.317 (1499.694, 1500.946)
Write Multi HR Min 1 50 1559.340 3.941 0.322 (1558.704, 1559.976)
Read HR Min 1 50 1562.340 3.941 0.322 (1561.704, 1562.976)
Write Multi HR Max 1 50 19781.280 3.881 0.317 (19780.654, 19781.906)
Read HR Max 1 50 20560.380 4.053 0.331 (20559.726, 20561.034)
Write Multi HR Max 5 50 21534.280 3.881 0.317 (21533.654, 21534.906)
Read HR Max 5 50 22332.380 4.053 0.331 (22331.726, 22333.034)
The minimal length responses all have very consistent processing times, ranging
from 1500 to 1600 clock cycles. The consistency between them suggests that the
similarity is due to the time it takes to query one ADC. The processing time responses for
maximum length commands increases signiﬁcantly over the processing time for minimum
length commands. For responses to commands that aﬀect coils it is interesting to note that
again writes take longer to process than reads despite operating on 32 fewer addresses
regardless of how many lines are monitored. This is contrary to responses to commands
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that aﬀect holding registers where its clear that order is ﬁrst decided by how many lines
are monitored and then by command type.
5.2.2 Infected Response MODBUS/TCP Workload.
Table 5.11 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the infected
response MODBUS/TCP workload for commands that operate on coils. The table
contains the number of lines monitored, the number of packets sent, the mean CPU cycles,
the standard deviation, the standard error of the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence interval.
The table is ordered by mean CPU cycles, equating to response processing time. The
range of mean command processing time for commands that operate on coils is 3190.187
to 302845.960 cycles.
Table 5.11: Infected Response Processing Times - Coils
Command Lines Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Monitored Received CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Read Coils Min 1 50 3190.187 32.236 2.632 (3184.986, 3195.388)
Write Multi Coil Min 1 50 3230.600 37.745 3.082 (3224.510, 3236.690)
Write Single Coil 1 50 3249.120 34.958 2.854 (3243.480, 3254.760)
Write Multi Coil Max Best 5 150 6257.527 37.535 3.065 (6251.471, 6263.583)
Write Multi Coil Max Best 1 150 6257.580 37.688 3.077 (6251.499, 6263.661)
Read Coils Max Best 1 50 6953.767 41.009 3.348 (6947.150, 6960.383)
Read Coils Max Best 5 50 6955.293 42.385 3.461 (6948.455, 6962.132)
Write Multi Coil Max Worst 1 50 297379.100 36.533 2.983 (297373.206, 297384.994)
Write Multi Coil Max Worst 5 50 299304.333 37.235 3.040 (299298.326, 299310.341)
Read Coils Max Worst 1 50 302817.060 41.849 3.417 (302810.308, 302823.812)
Read Coils Max Worst 5 50 302845.960 42.680 3.485 (302839.074, 302852.846)
Table 5.12 details the results of the one-variable t-test performed on the infected
response MODBUS/TCP workload for commands that operate on holding registers. The
table contains the number of lines monitored, the number of packets sent, the mean CPU
cycles, the standard deviation, the standard error of the mean, and the 95% conﬁdence
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interval. The table is ordered by mean CPU cycles, equating to response processing time.
The range of mean command processing time for commands that operate on coils is
2614.307 to 27213.313 cycles.
Table 5.12: Infected Response Processing Times - Holding Registers
Command Lines Packets Mean Stand. Standard Conﬁdence
Type Monitored Received CPU Dev. Error of the Interval
Cycles Mean (95%)
Write Single HR 1 50 2614.307 35.285 2.881 (2608.614, 2620.000)
Read HR Min 1 50 3150.913 36.991 3.020 (3144.945, 3156.881)
Write Multi HR Min 1 50 3205.480 31.790 2.596 (3200.351, 3210.609)
Write Multi HR Max Best 1 50 6300.213 37.976 3.101 (6294.086, 6306.340)
Write Multi HR Max Best 5 50 6300.920 37.340 3.049 (6294.896, 6306.944)
Read HR Max Best 1 50 6878.773 44.120 3.602 (6871.655, 6885.892)
Read HR Max Best 5 50 6878.820 44.687 3.649 (6871.610, 6886.030)
Write Multi HR Worst 1 50 24409.740 41.434 3.383 (24403.055, 24416.425)
Read HR Max Worst 1 50 25347.687 45.355 3.703 (25340.369, 25355.004)
Write Multi HR Max Worst 5 50 26268.400 40.482 3.305 (26261.869, 26274.931)
Read HR Max Worst 5 50 27213.313 46.432 3.791 (27205.822, 27220.805)
In the infected response MODBUS/TCP workload, minimum length commands
again take about the same time to process, around 3200 clock cycles. The exception to this
is the Write Single Holding Register command. This response’s mean response processing
time is 2614.307 clock cycles, about 600 clock cycles fewer than the other minimum
length commands. The diﬀerence is not evident in the response processing code but could
be due to an optimization in the compiled code.
For maximum length commands, some interesting cases to note are responses where
the location of the infected address are best. For these cases, there appears to be no or very
little diﬀerence between cases of one monitored line versus ﬁve monitored lines. This is
because the algorithm found that the ﬁrst address checked reported an incorrect line value,
causing the algorithm to immediately stop processing and log the packet. This is entirely
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intended behavior. Furthermore, responses to commands aﬀecting holding registers again
show an ordering where more lines monitored have a stronger eﬀect on whether a
command takes longer. For responses to commands aﬀecting coils read commands appear
seem to take longer than write commands. This indicates that for holding registers ADC
query time dominates whereas in coils number of operations dominates.
5.2.3 Overall Analysis of Experiment 2.
The overall range of response processing for valid MODBUS/TCP responses was
1500.32 to 294558.253 clock cycles whereas for infected MODBUS/TCP responses the
range was 2614.307 to 302845.96 clock cycles. The infected response MODBUS/TCP
range is higher for both the low and high range, demonstrating the cost of logging packets.
For maximum length coil commands, it was noted for the uninfected workload that write
commands take longer than read commands. This trend is reversed for infected responses
and is likely due to an interaction between the infected factor and total number of
operations.
5.3 Results and Analysis of Experiment 3
Experiment 3 required data processing from the results Experiments 1 and 2 before
execution could begin. In order to determine the exact command frequencies for Valid
Operation Break and Invalid Command - Saturated Break the total processing time of the
slowest valid command needed to be calculated and the slowest invalid command for the
saturated Bloom ﬁlter system needed to be determined. Table 5.13 shows each valid
command, its mean command processing time, the number of monitored lines for its
response, the mean response processing time for its response with the corresponding
number of monitored lines, and the total processing time. The table is ordered by total
command processing time from smallest to largest.
As can be seen, the maximum length Write Multiple Coils command with ﬁve
monitored lines has the highest total processing time. This equates to 3.15 ms per
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command. Inverting this result provided the fastest the system can run in the worst case,
yielding 317 commands per second. Since the required command frequency for the
experiment was meant to break valid operation, 317 commands per second was too slow.
350 commands per second was chosen instead.
Table 5.13: Valid Workload Total Processing Time
Command Mean CPU Number of Mean CPU Total
Type Cycles (Command) Lines Monitored Cycles (Response) Processing Time
Write Single Coil 2528.893 1 1549.32 4078.213
Write Single HR 2582.213 1 1500.32 4082.533
Read HR Min 2556.947 1 1562.34 4119.287
Read Coils Min 2551.307 1 1600.34 4151.647
Write Multi Coil Min 2629.66 1 1602.34 4232
Write Multi HR Min 2726.927 1 1559.34 4286.267
Read HR Max 8271.887 1 20560.38 28832.27
5 22332.38 30604.27
Write Multi HR Max 23897.11 1 19781.28 43678.39
5 21534.28 45431.39
Read Coils Max 92509.95 1 287937.1 380447
5 289766.6 382276.5
Write Multi Coil Max 99550.63 1 292730.3 392280.9
5 294558.3 394108.9
Selecting Invalid Command - Saturated Break was easier since total processing time
was not necessary, only the command processing time was needed. In this case, the
slowest command processing time for the saturated Bloom ﬁlter system is Write Multiple
Coils with the invalid address being in the worst position. The mean CPU cycles for this
command is 96438.433 cycles, equating to 771.82 μs per command. Inverting this
provided a maximum command frequency of 1295 commands per second. Since breaking
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the operation was necessary, 1400 commands per second was chosen for Invalid
Command Saturate Break.
5.3.1 Valid MODBUS/TCP Results.
Table 5.14 details the results of the one-variable t-tests performed on the packets
logged and packets inspected for the worst case valid MODBUS/TCP command,
maximum length Write Multiple Coils. The table shows the Bloom ﬁlter false positive
rate, the command frequency, the number of packets sent, the mean number of packets
logged, the mean number of packets inspected, the 95% conﬁdence interval for the
number of packets logged, and the 95% conﬁdence interval for the number of packets
inspected. The table is ordered by Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate then by command
frequency. Figure 5.1 graphs the mean number of packets logged and the mean number of
packets intercepted for the Bloom ﬁlter false positive rates of saturated and non-saturated
shown in Table 5.14.
Table 5.14: Valid MODBUS/TCP Workload
Bloom ﬁlter Command Packets Mean Mean Conﬁdence Int. Conﬁdence Int.
False Positive Frequency Sent Packets Packets Packets Logged Packets Inspected
Rate Logged Inspected (95%) (95%)
Non-saturated 200 10000 0.000 10000.000 (0.000, 0.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
350 10000 448.000 9776.000 (448.000, 448.000) (9776.000, 9776.000)
1400 10000 2366.667 4493.333 (2365.478, 2367.856) (4492.360, 4494.307)
5000 10000 1164.000 1851.333 (1163.369, 1164.631) (1850.792, 1851.874)
Saturated 200 10000 0.000 10000.000 (0.000, 0.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
350 10000 449.000 9776.000 (444.697, 453.303) (9776.000, 9776.000)
1400 10000 2344.667 4475.667 (2281.123, 2408.211) (4355.852, 4595.482)
5000 10000 1122.000 1812.667 (1057.556, 1186.444) (1735.126, 1890.207)
At 200 commands per second the SIEVE system operates correctly; that is, all 10000
packets are inspected and zero are logged. At 350 commands per second and subsequent
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Figure 5.1: Valid MODBUS/TCP Workload Packet Intercepts
command frequencies where valid operation begins to break down and false positives are
reported. This is due to the system not being able to process packets fast enough such that
the receive buﬀers of the Ethernet core ﬁll up, causing packets to be dropped. The dropped
packets cause the algorithm to behave erratically because the system will either see
commands without responses or responses that do not correspond to the previous
command. An interesting feature, visible in Figure 5.1, is that the packets logged at 5000
commands per second is fewer than the packets logged at 1400 commands per second.
This is explained by looking at the number of packets inspected for both points. At 1400
commands per second, approximately 4490 packets are inspected while about 2350 are
logged. At 5000 commands per second approximately 1850 packets are inspected while
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1160 are logged. The proportion of logged packets to inspected packets is greater for the
5000 commands per second case indicating a higher false positive rate.
Additionally, the non-saturated bloom ﬁlter system inspected more packets on
average than the saturated bloom ﬁlter system but logged approximately the same
proportion.
5.3.2 Invalid Command MODBUS/TCP Workload.
Table 5.15 details the results of the one-variable t-tests performed on the packets
logged and packets inspected for the worst case invalid command MODBUS/TCP
workload, maximum length Write Multiple Coils with an invalid address as the last
address operated on. The table shows the Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate, the command
frequency, the number of packets sent, the mean number of packets logged, the mean
number of packets inspected, the 95% conﬁdence interval for the number of packets
logged, and the 95% conﬁdence interval for the number of packets inspected. The table is
ordered by Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate then by command frequency. Figure 5.2 graphs
the mean number of packets logged and the mean number of packets intercepted for the
Bloom ﬁlter false positive rates of saturated and non-saturated shown in Table 5.15.
Table 5.15: Invalid MODBUS/TCP Command Workload
Bloom ﬁlter Command Packets Mean Mean Conﬁdence Int. Conﬁdence Int.
False Positive Frequency Sent Packets Packets Packets Logged Packets Inspected
Rate Logged Inspected (95%) (95%)
Not Saturated 200 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
350 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
1400 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
5000 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
Saturated 200 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
350 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
1400 10000 9382.333 9382.333 (9378.539, 9386.128) (9378.539, 9386.128)
5000 10000 3896.667 3896.667 (3726.502, 4066.832) (3726.502, 4066.832)
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Figure 5.2: Invalid Command MODBUS/TCP Packet Intercepts
As can be seen in Figure 5.2, logged and inspected packets begin dropping at 1400
commands per second. This is expected since 1400 commands per second was supposed
to degrade operations, distinguishing it from the non-saturated Bloom ﬁlter system. In this
case, at both 1400 commands per second and 5000 commands per second, the
non-saturated Bloom ﬁlter inspects and logs all packets. The saturated Bloom ﬁlter
inspects fewer than 3900 packets at the 5000 commands per second level, dropping over
half of the packets sent.
On logging ability, both systems logged every packet they received, meaning there
are zero false negatives.
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5.3.3 Infected Response MODBUS/TCP Workload.
Table 5.16 details the results of the one-variable t-tests performed on the packets
logged and packets inspected for the worst case infected response MODBUS/TCP
workload, maximum length Write Multiple Coils with ﬁve monitored lines and the last
monitored address being infected. The table shows the Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate, the
command frequency, the number of packets sent, the mean number of packets logged, the
mean number of packets inspected, the 95% conﬁdence interval for the number of packets
logged, and the 95% conﬁdence interval for the number of packets inspected. The table is
ordered by Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate then by command frequency. Figure 5.3 graphs
the mean number of packets logged and the mean number of packets intercepted for the
Bloom ﬁlter false positive rates of saturated and non-saturated shown in Table 5.16.
Table 5.16: Infected MODBUS/TCP Response Workload
Bloom ﬁlter Command Packets Mean Mean Conﬁdence Int. Conﬁdence Int.
False Positive Frequency Sent Packets Packets Packets Logged Packets Inspected
Rate Logged Inspected (95%) (95%)
Not Saturated 200 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
350 10000 9732.000 9732.000 (9732.000, 9732.000) (9732.000, 9732.000)
1400 10000 4342.667 4343.000 (4342.568, 4342.766) (4342.896, 4343.104)
5000 10000 1820.333 1820.333 (1820.181, 1820.485) (1820.181, 1820.485)
Saturated 200 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
350 10000 9732.000 9732.000 (9732.000, 9732.000) (9732.000, 9732.000)
1400 10000 4326.667 4326.667 (4200.872, 4452.462) (4200.872, 4452.462)
5000 10000 1806.667 1806.667 (1752.166, 1861.167) (1752.166, 1861.167)
For the infected response MODBUS/TCP workload both systems’ performance
begins to drop at 350 commands per second. At 1400 commands per second, fewer than
half of the packets sent are inspected and logged. This is expected considering that the
processing times for valid responses are slightly faster than processing times for infected
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Figure 5.3: Infected Response Processing Time - Holding Registers
responses. However, at the goal rate of 200 commands per second, all packets sent are
logged and inspected.
5.3.4 Non-MODBUS/TCP Workload.
Table 5.17 details the results of the one-variable t-tests performed on the packets
logged and packets inspected for the non-MODBUS/TCP workload. The table shows the
Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate, the command frequency, the number of packets sent, the
mean number of packets logged, the mean number of packets inspected, the 95%
conﬁdence interval for the number of packets logged, and the 95% conﬁdence interval for
the number of packets inspected. The table is ordered by Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate
then by command frequency. Figure 5.4 graphs the mean number of packets logged and
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the mean number of packets intercepted for the Bloom ﬁlter false positive rates of
saturated and non-saturated shown in Table 5.17.
Table 5.17: Non-MODBUS/TCP Workload
Bloom ﬁlter Command Packets Mean Mean Conﬁdence Int. Conﬁdence Int.
False Positive Frequency Sent Packets Packets Packets Logged Packets Inspected
Rate Logged Inspected (95%) (95%)
Not Saturated 200 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
350 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
1400 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
5000 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
Saturated 200 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
350 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
1400 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
5000 10000 10000.000 10000.000 (10000.000, 10000.000) (10000.000, 10000.000)
For the non-MODBUS/TCP workload, all of the packets sent are logged and
inspected at all of the command frequencies tested. The Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate did
not have any eﬀect on packet logging or inspection.
5.3.5 Overall Analysis of Experiment 3.
Among the workloads tested, it is clear that invalid MODBUS/TCP commands and
non-MODBUS/TCP traﬃc are handled more quickly by the SIEVE system. This is likely
because they are identiﬁed as being invalid, negating the need to process a response, or are
identiﬁed as not being MODUS/TCP in hardware. Valid MODBUS/TCP traﬃc and the
infected MODBUS/TCP response both inspected about the same number of packets with
all of the invalid responses correctly being logged. Since the workloads used for this test
are all worst case and all tests showed 100% inspection rates at the 200 command per
second frequency any other workload should be able to be handled at 200 commands per
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Figure 5.4: Invalid Response Processing Time - Holding Registers
second or slower. This indicates that the goal of the research is achieved since any
command with a response can be processed in under 5 ms.
The Bloom ﬁlter false positive rate only showed signiﬁcant improvements for the
invalid MODBUS/TCP command workload. This is expected since only invalid
commands should get rejected by the MODBUS inspection core.
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VI. Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the goals and conclusions of the research. Section 6.1summarizes the results of the experiments and whether the goals are met.
Section 6.2 explains the signiﬁcance of the research. Lastly, Section 6.3 describes further
work that can be done with this research.
6.1 Conclusions
The goal of this research is to determine if a speciﬁcations-based SCADA integrity
veriﬁcation system could correctly verify the integrity of incoming network traﬃc and
device response in realtime. Three experiments are performed to demonstrate this. The
ﬁrst experiment shows that in the worst case, commands take no longer than 796.4 μs for
processing. The second experiment shows that in the worst case 3.15 ms is required to
process a response. These results feed into the third experiment which shows that for all
worst case workload types 100% of packets are inspected and, if necessary, logged at a
200 command per second frequency. This means that no matter the packet type, it is
inspected/logged in under ﬁve ms, meeting the research goal.
For the secondary goal of the experiment, Experiment 1 shows the beneﬁt of a
properly tuned Bloom ﬁlter. For the worst case invalid MODBUS/TCP command, a Write
Multiple Coils command that operated on 1968 consecutive coils, the last of which is an
invalid address, the non-saturated Bloom ﬁlter system saves 88584.813 clock cycles over
the saturated Bloom ﬁlter system. Equating that to real time, the non-saturated Bloom
ﬁlter system saves 708.7 μs or an improvement of 1127.95%. This also translates into
improved performance in Experiment 3 where at a 5000 command per second frequency
the non-saturated Bloom ﬁlter system logs all packets sent whereas the saturated Bloom
93
ﬁlter system logs less than half. Overall, this demonstrates the value of the Bloom ﬁlter in
a SCADA integrity veriﬁcation system.
6.2 Signiﬁcance
The demand for improved access to and setup of SCADA networks has ultimately
left them vulnerable to attack. Current research eﬀorts focus more on detection of attacks
or malicious traﬃc. Detecting a compromised device is more diﬃcult as it requires
knowledge of what the PLC is actually doing. Together, these services represent the
veriﬁcation of the integrity of the inputs and outputs of the system. This research
produced the ﬁrst SCADA integrity veriﬁcation device.
As the ﬁrst of its kind, it can be diﬃcult to express the signiﬁcance of the SIEVE
system. It can be used as a high-eﬃciency intrusion detection system for PLCs in addition
to the more signiﬁcant role it can take on as a forensic device. As stated above, detecting a
compromised device is more diﬃcult due to requiring knowledge of exactly how the PLC
is operating. Since the SIEVE system is speciﬁcation based, it knows what the PLC
should be doing and checks it as commands are sent. This means that a Stuxnet-like attack
can be defeated as the operators will be warned when the PLC is not doing what it is
instructed to.
6.3 Future Work
The ﬁrst, and perhaps foremost, area for future work with this research would be to
extending its support for 16-bit registers. This is important as MODBUS supports 16-bit
registers; however, due to limitations of the SIEVE system this was not possible to
implement for this research. The limiting factor for the SIEVE system was the ADC used
for current sensing. The 12-bit ADS7818p, due to the limitations discussed in Chapter 3,
can truly only distinguish eight-bits for this kind of application. Sixteen-bit support will
require at minimum a 20-bit ADC for the same reasons.
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The second area for future work would also be improving the current sense circuit.
The current implementation appears to have grounding issues, meaning that distinguishing
voltage levels is diﬃcult for the ADC. This could be ﬁxed through use of a printed circuit
board specially designed for the application. Another improvement could be the current
sense resistor. At 200 Ω it dissipates 80 mW of power which could aﬀect the performance
of the PLC. A smaller resistor would lower this power dissipation but likely require an
ampliﬁer stage in order to boost the voltage drop into a range that can be sensed by the
ADC.
Another area for future work with this research would be in improving response
processing time. As it is implemented currently, processing a response can take a
signiﬁcant amount of time, up to four times the amount of time needed to process a
command in some cases. One way which this can be accomplished is through
optimization of the process itself or taking advantage of the second PowerPC core on the
FPGA and dividing the work.
Lastly, the warnings sent to operators is currently only visible on a single computer
screen. Better warning mechanisms could be investigated such as sending an e-mail or an
SMS text message. Since the SIEVE system operates in realtime, its warning capabilities
could also be integrated into other systems. This could allow more automatic actions to be
taken.
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Appendix A: Experimental Scenarios
This appendix contains listings of the scenarios used in Experiments 1, 2, and3. Section A.1 contains the scenarios for Experiment 1, Section A.2 contains the
scenarios for Experiment 2, and Section A.3 contains the scenarios for Experiment 3.
A.1 Experiment 1 Scenarios
Table A.1: Experiment 1 Scenarios
Workload Command Type Command Length Invalid Location Bloom Filter False
Positive Rate
Valid MODBUS/TCP Read Coils Min 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Read Coils Max 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Read H. Registers Min 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Read H. Registers Max 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple Coils Min 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple Coils Max 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple H. Registers Min 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple H. Registers Max 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Write Single Coil 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Write Single H. Reg 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read Coils Min 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read Coils Max Best 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read Coils Max Worst 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read H. Registers Min 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read H. Registers Max Best 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read H. Registers Max Worst 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple Coils Min 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple Coils Max Best 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple Coils Max Worst 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple H. Registers Min 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple H. Registers Max Best 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple H. Registers Max Worst 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Single Coil 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Single H. Reg 1
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Workload Command Type Command Length Invalid Location Bloom Filter False
Positive Rate
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read Coils Min Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read Coils Max Best Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read Coils Max Worst Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read H. Registers Min Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read H. Registers Max Best Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Read H. Registers Max Worst Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple Coils Min Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple Coils Max Best Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple Coils Max Worst Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple H. Registers Min Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple H. Registers Max Best Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Multiple H. Registers Max Worst Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Single Coil Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Write Single Reg Not 1
Not Modbus 1
Not Modbus Not 1
A.2 Experiment 2 Scenarios
Table A.2: Experiment 2 Scenarios
Infection Response Length Inv Loc Monitored
Not Infected Read Coils Min 1
Not Infected Read Coils Max 1
Not Infected Read Coils Max 5
Not Infected Read H. Registers Min 1
Not Infected Read H. Registers Max 1
Not Infected Read H. Registers Max 5
Not Infected Write Multiple Coils Min 1
Not Infected Write Multiple Coils Max 1
Not Infected Write Multiple Coils Max 5
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Infection Response Length Inv Loc Monitored
Not Infected Write Multiple H. Registers Min 1
Not Infected Write Multiple H. Registers Max 1
Not Infected Write Multiple H. Registers Max 5
Not Infected Write Single Coil 1
Not Infected Write Single H. Register 1
Infected Read Coils Min 1
Infected Read Coils Max Best 1
Infected Read Coils Max Worst 1
Infected Read Coils Max Best 5
Infected Read Coils Max Worst 5
Infected Read H. Registers Min 1
Infected Read H. Registers Max Best 1
Infected Read H. Registers Max Worst 1
Infected Read H. Registers Max Best 5
Infected Read H. Registers Max Worst 5
Infected Write Multiple Coils Min 1
Infected Write Multiple Coils Max Best 1
Infected Write Multiple Coils Max Worst 1
Infected Write Multiple Coils Max Best 5
Infected Write Multiple Coils Max Worst 5
Infected Write Multiple H. Registers Min 1
Infected Write Multiple H. Registers Max Best 1
Infected Write Multiple H. Registers Max Worst 1
Infected Write Multiple H. Registers Max Best 5
Infected Write Multiple H. Registers Max Worst 5
Infected Write Single Coil 1
Infected Write Single H. Register 1
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A.3 Experiment 3 Scenarios
Table A.3: Experiment 3 Scenarios
Workload PLC Infection Command Frequency BF False Positive Rate
Valid MODBUS/TCP Uninfected 200 Not 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Uninfected 350 Not 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Uninfected 1400 Not 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Uninfected 5000 Not 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Uninfected 200 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Uninfected 350 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Uninfected 1400 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Uninfected 5000 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Infected 200 Not 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Infected 350 Not 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Infected 1400 Not 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Infected 5000 Not 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Infected 200 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Infected 350 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Infected 1400 1
Valid MODBUS/TCP Infected 5000 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Command 200 Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Command 350 Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Command 1400 Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Command 5000 Not 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Command 200 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Command 350 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Command 1400 1
Invalid MODBUS/TCP Command 5000 1
Non-MODBUS/TCP 200 Not 1
Non-MODBUS/TCP 350 Not 1
Non-MODBUS/TCP 1400 Not 1






Appendix B: Emulated PLC Design
This appendix covers the operation and design of the emulated PLC. SectionB.1 explains the basic operation of device, and Section B.2 covers the design of the
Digital to Analog Converter (DAC) Bank.
B.1 Operation
The function of the emulated PLC is to behave like a PLC. This means it needs to
respond to sent commands and update its connected lines if necessary. Since the
workloads are known a priori, the responses sent are not calculated and built but read from
a pcap ﬁle stored on a compact ﬂash card. This eliminates complexity in the code at the
cost of ﬂexibility as the pcap ﬁle must be updated for each workload. Updating the analog
lines is accomplished using DAC current sources. Their operation is described below in
Section B.2.
B.2 DAC Bank
The DAC bank serves as a single point where the CPU can interact with the DAC
modems. It also provides the serial clock from which the DACs clock their data. This top
level entity contains ﬁve DACs, each set to a diﬀerent 18-bit address. The DAC selected
for this design is the AD5410 from Analog Devices. The AD5410 was chosen due to
being a Digital to Analog Current Source. The advantage of a straight conversion to
current rather than sourcing a voltage ﬁrst is that it results in a much simpler circuit. In
fact, the output of the AD5410 can be used to directly drive a 4 mA to 20 mA current
loop, allowing it to be used as the current source in Figure 3.10.
The AD5410 is a 12-bit digital to analog current source. It’s output current, based on
the 12-bit input, is conﬁgurable to three ranges: 0 mA to 20 mA, 0 mA to 24 mA, and 4
mA to 20 mA. Since this research focuses on 4 mA to 20 mA control, the third range is
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∗ D + 4 mA (B.1)
where D is the 12-bit data value [Dev13]. The chip is capable of updating its current from
4 mA to 20 mA in 6 μs.
Data written to the DAC is sent three bytes at a time. The ﬁrst byte is a register
address while the latter two bytes are data. The AD5410 has ﬁve registers: NOP register,
data register, readback register, control register, and reset register. For this research only
the data and control registers are necessary. Figure B.1 shows the write timing to the
DAC. The three bytes are output one bit at a time, from the most signiﬁcant bit to the least
signiﬁcant, over 24 clock cycles. The data is latched into a shift register on the chip when
the latch signal transitions from low to high. At the start of operation, 0x551005 is written
to the chip. These three bytes write to the control register, select the 4 mA to 20 mA
range, and enable output. Subsequent writes are to the data register and will alter the
output current.
Like the ADC Bank, the DAC bank also generates the serial clock for the chips. This
is done in the same way, using a counter to toggle the new, slower clock up or down. For
the AD5410s this clock rate is 10.42 MHz. The data is directed to the correct DAC
modem by matching an address that is hardcoded in VHDL to one that is written to the
core by the CPU. If the address is a match, the selected modem outputs the data according
to the timing shown above.
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Figure B.1: DAC Write Timing [Dev13]
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Appendix C: SIEVE System Setup
This appendix covers the conﬁguration and setup of the SIEVE system. Section C.1is a hardware description of the system, Section C.2 explains how to conﬁgure the
Bloom ﬁlters and prepare them for loading to the FPGA, and Section C.3 shows how to
load the system onto the ML507 development board using the Base System Builder in the
Xilinx Platform Studio.
C.1 Hardware Description
This section describes each component of the SIEVE system and the role it takes in
overall operation.
C.1.1 Processor.
The SIEVE system uses one of the embedded PowerPC 440 cores. This CPU
executes the software application.
C.1.2 Processor Local Bus.
The Processor Local Bus connects the CPU to other peripherals on the development
board. Communication with diﬀerent Intellectual Property (IP) cores is accomplished
using software registers and a 32-bit address system.
C.1.3 Block Random Access Memory.
The Block RAM structure is conﬁgured to have 128 KB of memory. It stores the
main program as well as the stack and the heap.
C.1.4 XPS Tri-mode Ethernet Media Access Controller.
This IP core enables communication with the onboard Ethernet PHY chip. It is
conﬁgured to be in promiscuous mode, receiving Ethernet frames regardless of their
destination address. It is also conﬁgured to operate in GMII mode, enabling gigabit
network speeds.
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C.1.5 XPS Direct Memory Access Controller.
The XPS DMA controller is used to enable ﬁxed length burst transfers up to 64 bytes
long across the PLB. This speeds up data transfer from one IP core to another through
elimination of overhead cycles used in negotiating single beat transfers.
C.1.6 Static Random Access Memory.
The ML507 has one MB of oﬀ chip SRAM. This memory is used for storing the
function code valid for each address and the valid data ranges for the holding registers.
The function code check is stored as one byte per address and represents the entire
MODBUS memory space, requiring 256 KB of memory. The range check stores the low
value and high value for each MODBUS holding register, storing each in two bytes (four
bytes total). Combining both the low and high range check, another 256 KB of memory is
required. In total, half of this module is used for storage.
C.1.7 Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory.
The ML507 has one oﬀ chip 256 MB SDRAM module and is used for storing the
packet log ﬁle. The SRAM memory is not used for this since the log ﬁle can grow
indeﬁnitely. Since only 512 KB of memory was left in the SRAM, it was decided to store
the ﬁle in the SDRAM where it can grow for longer.
C.1.8 XPS System ACE Controller.
This component allows reading and writing of ﬁles to compact ﬂash cards. On
bootup, the function code check and range checks are loaded into the SRAM from this
module. When operation is complete or the log ﬁle needs to be inspected, the log ﬁle is
copied to the card using this module.
C.1.9 XPS Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter Lite.
This IP core controls the RS232 connection using a UART. It is conﬁgured to
communicate at a 115200 baud rate and is used to communicate device status and
warnings to the operators.
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C.1.10 Custom Timer.
This IP core was written to provide the number of microseconds and seconds since it
was last reset. Both are used when timestamping a logged packet. The microseconds are
determined by maintaining a counter that counts up once every system clock cycle. When
125 clock cycles have passed, the microsecond counter is incremented by one. After the
microsecond counter has been incremented 1e6 times, the seconds counter is incremented.
Both the seconds counter and microseconds counter can be reset by the CPU.
C.1.11 MODBUS Inspection Core.
The design and operation of this core is covered in Section 3.3.1.
C.1.12 ADC Bank.
The design and operation of this core is covered in Section 3.3.3.
C.2 Bloom Filter Conﬁguration
This section covers the conﬁguration of the Bloom ﬁlters and preparing them to be
loaded onto the ML507 development board.
1. To begin, copy the following ﬁles into a directory that Matlab can operate in:
• plc.txt
• mpack creator.m
• bf gen k 10 m 16k read.m
• bf gen k 10 m 16k.m
2. Next, set up plc.txt to reﬂect the plc. The format is as folows:
<type> <address> <low> <high> <increment> <function_codes>
where <type> is the MODBUS construct type (c=coil, d=discrete input, h= holding
register, i=input register), <address> is the MODBUS address, <low> is the low
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value a register should take, <high> is the high value, and <increment> is how the
data values should increase from low to high. The last ﬁeld, <function codes>, is an
encoding of how the construct can be accessed. It is a four character long string and
informs the mpack creator.m script as to which function codes are valid for that
construct. The string is set up as follows:
<read single><read multiple><write single><write multiple>
An ‘s’ in the <read single> ﬁeld or ‘m’ in the <read multiple> ﬁelds signify that the
the construct can be read. An ‘s’ in the <write single> ﬁeld means it can be written
to using a Write Single command and an ‘m’ in the <write multiple> ﬁeld means it
can be written to using a Write Multiple command. An ‘x’ should be used when a
function code should not be used. Some examples are:
d 55 0 0 0 smxx
h 23 20 150 5 smsx
The discrete input is at address 55, which gets converted to hex 0x37, and can be
read. The holding register is at address 23 (hex 0x17), has a low value of 20, a high
value of 150, an increment of 5, can be read, and can be written to singly only.








The ﬁrst two are used to generate the Bloom ﬁlters while the last three need to be
stored on the CompactFlash card for use in operating the software.
4. Next, run both bf gen k 10 m 16k read.m and bf gen k 10 m 16k.m. They will
generate coeﬃcient ﬁles (.coe) that will be read by the Xilinx Core Generator to
initialize the Bloom ﬁlters.
5. After the Bloom ﬁlter generator scripts have ﬁnished, navigate to the
Modbus Inspection v2\ipcore dir\directory. Copy the coeﬃcient ﬁles (.coe)
generated by Matlab into this directory, overwriting the old ones.
6. Next, open the Xilinx Core Generator program and open the project located in
Modbus Inspection v2\ipcore dir\. Click on “Project”, then “Regenerate all project
IP (under current project settings)”.
7. After the IP cores have been regenerated, navigate back to
Modbus Inspection v2\ipcore dir\. Copy the generated bf bram * *.ngc ﬁles into
\pcores\modbus inspector core v1 00 a\netlist , overwriting the ﬁles there. The
Bloom ﬁlters are now ready to be loaded onto the FPGA!
C.3 Installation
This section covers how to set up the hardware and install the software for the SIEVE
system using the Xilinx ISE Design Suite, version 13.2.
1. First, open the Xilinx Platform Studio, select “Base System Builder wizard” and
press “OK”.
2. Select a directory to store the project and set the radio button to “PLB System”.
Click “OK”
3. Select “I would like to create a new design.” and click “Next”.
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4. Select “I would like to create a system for the following development board”. From
the dropdown for Board Vendor select “Xilinx”. From the dropdown for Board
Name select “Virtex 5 ML507 Evaluation Platorm”. From the dropdown for Board
Revision select ‘A’. Click “Next”.
5. Select “Single-Processor System”. Click “Next”.
6. From the dropdown for Processor Type select “PowerPC”. From the dropdowns for
both Processor Clock Frequency and Bus Clock Frequency select “125.00”. From
the dropdown for Debug Interface select “FPGA JTAG”. Click “Next”.
7. In the Peripheral Conﬁguration window remove all peripherals except for
DDR2 SDRAM, RS232 Uart 1, SRAM, SysACE CompactFlash, and
xps bram if cntlr 1. Add Hard Ethernet MAC to the processor. The window should
look like Figure C.1, below. Change the Baud Rate of the RS232 Uart 1 core from
9600 to 115200. Change the size of the xps bram if cntlr 1 core from 8KB to 128
KB. Click “Next”.
8. Enable the check boxes for both the Instruction Cache and Data Cache. Enable only
xps bram if cntlr 1 under instruction cache and all three memories under Data
Cache. Click “Next”.
9. Click “Finish”.
10. In the directory where the system was created, make a new folder called “pcores”.
Copy the folders \adc bank core v7 00 a, \custom timer core v1 00 a, and
\modbus inspector core v1 00 a from the \pcores\folder on the CD into the newly
created pcores folder.
11. In the Xilinx Platform Studio window, click Hardware, then “Rescan User
Repositories”.
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Figure C.1: Peripheral Conﬁguration Window
12. On the left side of the Platform Studio window, click IP Catalog. Expand Project
Local PCores, USER. Add the three IP cores to the project.
13. In the System Assembly View, on the Bus Interfaces tab expand each of the newly
added cores. Set the SPLB dropdown to “plb v46 0”.
14. Change to the Ports tab in the System Assembly View. Expand the adc bank core 0.
Change the dropdown for each of the ports to “Make External”.
15. Change to the Addresses tab in the System Assembly View. Click the Generate
Addresses button in the upper right corner. Change the uppermost byte of the Base
Address of the SRAM from 8 to D, as shown below in Figure C.2.
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Figure C.2: SRAM Address Setting























17. Click Project, then Export Hardware Design to SDK. This will take some time
depending on the capabilities of the computer.
18. When the Xilinx SDK opens, click File, then New, then New Xilinx Board Support
Package. Select “Standalone” for the Board Support OS and click “Finish”.
19. In the window that opens up, click the check box next to “xilfatfs”. A new xilfatfs
conﬁguration should appear in the window on the left. Select it, then change
conﬁg write’s value to TRUE. Click “OK”.
20. Copy the peripheral tests 0 folder from the program folder on the CD into the
SDK Export directory of the directory the system is stored in.
21. Restart Xilinx SDK and the hardware and software installation is complete.
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